Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest by Editors,
[Vol. 100
NOTES
PHILADELPHIA POLICE PRACTICE AND THE LAW OF
ARREST t
Introduction.-In order to protect the individual from arbitrary police
action every state has rules requiring police officers to have a certain
amount of information before making an arrest. This note will state the
rules of Pennsylvania on this subject;' it will then set forth the grounds
upon which the Philadelphia police in practice make arrests. The law and
the practice will be compared to see whether there are gaps between the
two, and solutions will be offered to minimize any discrepancies found
to exist.
TiiE PENNSYLVANIA LAW
"The ordinary mode of criminal procedure requires a warrant of
arrest founded on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
to be first issued against the accused by some magistrate having com-
petent jurisdiction. The accused, who may be an innocent person,
thus secures at the outset the efficient guaranties against the oppres-
sion of power or prejudice afforded by the moral and legal responsi-
bilities of a public oath, and the liability on the part of his prosecutor
to respond in damages if the prosecution be malicious. The fitness
and propriety of this proceeding and its equal justice to accuser and
accused, make it unwise to depart from it, except under special cir-
cumstances or pressing emergencies." 2
Arrest under Warrant.-A formal complaint 3 is a constitutional pre-
requisite to the issuance of a warrant.4 A complaint is the written 5
i The research for this Note was financed by the annual grant to the University
of Pennsylvania Law School for studies on Law Enforcement and Individual Liberty.
This grant is provided by Jacob Kossman, Esq., of the Philadelphia Bar, in memory
of the late Justice Wiley Rutledge.
The Law Review wishes to express its appreciation for the generous cooperation
given the writers by Commissioner of Police Thomas Gibbons, First Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney Michael von Moschzisker, and the many other officers and attorneys
whose assistance was of great value.
1. This note is not concerned with the greater amount of information an officer
must have before he may shoot one fleeing arrest.
2. Com. v. Krubeck, 23 Pa. C.C. 35, 37 (1899).
3. For discussion of complaint see CARRINGER, PROCEDURE BxFaFo COM!MITTING
MAGISTRATES IN PENNSYLVANIA 42 (1947); 1 SADLER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN
PENNSYLVANIA §72 (2d ed. 1937).
4. Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania declares that "no
warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without
describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant." These words have been held to
require a complaint. Conner v. Com., 3 Binn. 38 (Pa. 1891) ; Com. v. Smith, 185
Pa. 553, 40 AtI. 73 (1898). A similar provision is found in the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
5. Kessler v. Hoffman, 9 Dist. 365 (Pa. 1900).
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accusation before a member of the minor judiciary charging a named or
accurately described person 0 with having committed a specified offense
whose essential elements must be set forth.7  The complaint shall be
made upon "probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, subscribed
by the affiant." 8 Probable cause may be supplied by personal knowledge
or on information received, provided the complainant states the name of
his informant and swears that he believes the information to be true.9 The
complaint may be made by any person capable of taking an oath.10
Whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for the arrest of
the accused is determined by the magistrate in the exercise of his judicial
discretion. If the magistrate does not regard the facts set forth in the
complaint as sufficient cause or if he thinks the complainant is not worthy
of belief because of infamous reputation, youth, or drunken condition, it
is his duty to refuse to issue a warrant." It appears that few of the
magistrates of Philadelphia are aware of their rights and duties; the con-
sensus of opinion among those interviewed is that the mere act of swearing
out a complaint furnishes probable cause, and they automatically issue a
warrant upon the complaint of an officer.
12
Despite the ease with which warrants may be obtained, the Philadel-
phia police almost never use them. Of a total of 770 arrests examined
by the writers only 24, or 3%, were authorized by warrants.18 The
6. PA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
7. Com. v. Gelbert, 170 Pa. 426, 32 Atl. 1091 (1895).
8. PA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
9. Com. v. Roland, 10 Dist. 410 (Pa. 1900) ; Com. v. Clement, 8 Dist. 705 (Pa.
1898). See also Conner v. Com., 3 Binn. 38 (Pa. 1891).
10. Com. v. Hamilton, 74 Pa. Super. 419 (1920).
11. Com. v. Cartusciello, 100 Pa. Super. 473 (1930); Com. v. Clement, 8 Dist.
705 (Pa. 1898).
12. On warrants see CARRINGER, op. cit. smpra note 3, at 55; 1 SADLER, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 76.
13. The breakdown of these cases by crime is as follows:
CRIME ARRESTS No. OF WARRANTS
Arson ............................... 3 0
Assault and Battery .................. 57 6
Burglary ............................. 36 1
Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapons ... 17 0
Conspiracy ........................... 6 0
Contributing to the Delinquency of a
M inor ........................... 9 0
Contempt of Court. ................... 1 0
Disorderly Conduct and Breach of the
Peace ........................... 49 0
Drugs ............................... 51 0
Drunkenness ......................... 8 0
Fornication and Bastardy .............. 1 1
Homicide ............................ 18 1
Indecent Exposure ................... 2 0
Larceny ............................. 48 2
Liquor ............................... 64 2
Lottery (Numbers) .................. 141 1
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3% figure based on these statistics is undoubtedly too high. The 770
cases include relatively few of the large number of unrecorded arrests
where the person arrested is released without being charged with a crime;
these "informal" arrests are always made without warrant. Of course,
these figures do not necessarily demonstrate the illegality of the arrests
studied, for the law does permit arrests to be made without warrant under
certain circumstances. However, it seems improbable that so large a
proportion of arrests could have been legal without warrants.
All of the police interviewed freely admitted that the warrant has
fallen into disuse.14  One explanation advanced is that the reluctance to
seek a warrant is a carry-over from Prohibition days when obtaining a
warrant often resulted in a tip-off to the suspect. At any rate, the fear
exists that the suspect will be forewarned. That this fear is not un-
founded is the conviction of certain police officers who stated that magis-
trates continue to tip-off persons for whose arrests *warrants are ob-
tained.15 A more obvious reason why warrants are seldom used is that
the police have found arrests without warrants, even if illegal, to be as
effective as arrests with warrants.
Arrest without Warrant.-A police officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person for a felony: (1) when the person to be arrested has com-
mitted a felony in the presence of the officer, (2) when the person to be
arrested is known to have committed a felony, although not in the presence
of the officer, (3) when the officer knows that a felony has been com-
mitted and has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed it, (4) when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe
both that a felony has been committed and that the person to be arrested
CRIME ARRESTS No. OF WARRANTS
Maintaining a Gambling House ...... 16 0
Malicious Mischief ................... 6 0
Motor Vehicle Violations (serious) ... 78 0
Neglect and Cruelty to Children ...... 2 0
Obscene Pictures ..................... 2 1
Obtaining Property by False Pretenses 1 1
Pool Selling and Book Making ........ 36 1
Prostitution .......................... 29 1
Prowling & Loitering at Night ....... 3 0
Rape ................................ 9 1
Receiving Stolen Goods .............. 14 2
Robbery ............................. 32 2
Sodomy .............................. 9 0
Threats .............................. 4 1
Uniform Firearms Act ............... 15 0
Vagrancy ............................ 3 0
A 1930 Committee on Criminal Law and Criminology of the American Bar As-
sociation found that in the largest cities at least 95% of all arrests are made without
warrants. Yankwich, Lawless Enforcenzent of Law, 9 So. CALIF. L. REv. 14, 17
(1935).
14. Even high police officials estimated that 90 to 95% of all arrests in Phila-
delphia were made without warrants.
15. The police in Chicago make the same claim. Dash, Cracks in the Foundation
of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385, 391 (1951).
is the offender.' 6  The reasonable grounds that will justify an officer in
arresting without a warrant must be such as would lead a cautious or
prudent man to believe that the party is guilty. The officer's belief may
be based upon facts or circumstances within his own knowledge or upon
information derived from reliable and credible third persons.
17
With regard to arrest by an officer without a warrant for a misde-
meanor, the Pennsylvania cases reflect a split which existed at common
law. :8 Several cases declare that an officer may arrest without a warrant
for a misdemeanor committed in his presence, if the misdemeanor amounts
to a breach of the peace '9 -i.e., if it contains an element of actual or threat-
ened violence. 20  However, the prevailing Pennsylvania view is that an
officer may arrest for any misdemeanor committed in his presence.
21
Either rule requires that the officer believe on the evidence of his senses
that the misdemeanor is being committed in his presence.22  One lower
court case has departed from the requirement that the misdemeanor be
committed in the presence of the officer, upholding an arrest where the
officer arrived after the termination of an altercation but while the partici-
pants and all the evidence of the conflict remained on the scene.23
The rules for arrest without a warrant are framed without regard to
the exigencies of particular cases. Often these rules will permit an imme-
diate arrest when there is no danger of the suspect escaping or disposing
of evidence while the officer obtains a warrant. In such cases, it would
seem that, regardless of legal power, the officer should obtain a warrant. 24
Definition of Arrest.-In order to apply intelligently the rules of arrest
without a warrant it is essential to know what an arrest is and the exact
16. McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881) ; Com. v. Stirk, 5 Lanc. 415 (Pa.
1888) ; A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROcEDURE § 21 (1930) ; Pa. Senate Bill No. 988,
1949, "An Act to Consolidate, Revise, and Amend the Laws Relating to Criminal
Proceedings" 19; 1 SADLER, op. cit. szpra note 3, § 88.
17. McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881). Also see Hastie, J., in United
States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716, 721 (3d Cir. 1951) : "What is reasonable is a total
judgment. Analogies predicated upon segmentation of the basis of judgment in a
particular case are misleading. They tend to obscure the fact that differences small
in themselves but highly significant in relation to other facts throw cases of this sort
into entirely different perspective."
18. See A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 235 (1930) for discussion and cita-
tions.
19. E.g., Com. v. Jayne, 11 Pa. Super. 459 (1899); Com. v. Krubeck, 23 Pa.
C.C. 35 (1899).
20. Com. v. Sherman, 4 D. & C. 4 (Pa. 1930).
21. E.g., Com. v. Rubin, 82 Pa. Super. 315, 321 (1923); Rarick v. McManomon,
17 Pa. Super. 154, 157 (1901) ; Com. v. Van Leer, 75 D. & C. 404, 406 (Pa. 1950).
See also Stern, J., concurring in Corn. v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 88, 85 A.2d 425, 432
(1951). The A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE lists Pennsylvania in the group
of states which follows this rule (p. 233).
22. Com. v. Reynolds, 4 D. & C. 262 (Pa. 1923). An offense is committed in
the presence of the officer when he sees it committed, State v. Lutz, 85 W. Va. 330,
101 S.E. 434 (1919); hears it committed, State v. McAfee, 107 N.C. 812, 12 S.E.
435 (1890) ; and when he receives information of its commission by smell, M'Bride
v. United States, 284 Fed. 416 (5th Cir. 1922).
23. Com. v. Cosler, 5 North. 74, 8 Kulp 97 (Luzerne Co., Pa. 1895).
24. See Rarick v. McManonmon, 17 Pa. Super. 154, 158 (1901).
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moment at which it takes place. An officer may have sufficient informa-
tion to constitute reasonable grounds for a felony arrest by the time he
formally "books" a suspect, but if the arrest took place at some earlier
point of time, he may not then have had the reasonable grounds which the
law requires. 25 There are two common definitions of arrest. One is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to
answer for the commission of a crime.26 The other view is that any de-
privation or restraint of a person's liberty is an arrest whether or not it
culminates in the charging of a crime.27  This obviously embraces the
first definition.
What little authority there is in Pennsylvania favors the latter view.
A recent lower court case,28 apparently because it could find no Pennsyl-
vania definition of arrest, adopted one from a federal case: 29 "An arrest
is the taking, seizing or obtaining the person of another body or putting
hands upon him in the execution of process, or any act indicating an in-
tention to arrest." 30 The first part of this definition is very broad. In a
proposed codification of Pennsylvania criminal procedure, arrest was de-
fined as "putting a person under restraint or the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the commission
of an offense." 31
It seems likely that if an appellate court is called upon to take a stand
on what an arrest is, it will more firmly bind Pennsylvania to the proposed
Code's definition. That definition of arrest is clearly more conducive to safe-
guarding the constitutional rights of the individual. By a literal appli-
cation of the narrower definition, a search of the person, detention for
questioning and investigation, and wholesale round-ups of suspects would
not be arrests. This means that the police may engage in such activities
without being subject to the sanctions for an unlawful arrest. More im-
portant, the suspect is deprived of the procedural safeguards that attend
an arrest, such as prompt arraignment, the right to bail, and the advice
of friends and counsel. As Justice Douglas said in his concurring opinion
in United States v. Carignan, "What happens behind doors that are opened
25. On necessity of information at time of arrest see 6 C.J.S. 601 (1937) and
cases cited therein.
26. A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18 (1930); UNIFORM ARREST AcT
§ 1, 28 VA. L. REV. 343 (1942). For state statutes which define arrest in this way,
see 5 C.J. 385 n.2(a) (1916).
27. Turney v. Rhodes, 42 Ga. App. 104, 155 S.E. 112 (1930); Pratt v. Gross,
263 Ky. 521, 92 S.W.2d 788 (1936) ; People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y.S.
326 (1922) ; 1 ALEXANDER, LAW OF ARREST 353, 358 (1949). See also 5 C.J. 385
n.2(a) (1916). "The word 'arrest' is derived from the French word arreter, which
means to stop, to detain, to hinder, to obstruct"-ALExANDaR 353.
28. Com. v. Bothwell, 94 PITT. L.J. 451 (Pa. 1946).
29. United States v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084, 1086, No. 14568 (Cir. Ct. E.D.
Pa. 1830).
30. Com. v. Bothwell, 94 PITT. L.J. 451, 453 (Pa. 1946). Cf. Com. v. Reynolds,
4 D. & C. 262 (Pa. 1923).
31. Pa. Sen. Bill No. 988, 1949, p. 13.
and closed at the sole discretion of the police is a black chapter in every
country. .. .,, 32
There is much support in the case law of other jurisdictions and among
the text writers for the proposition that any restraint, however slight and
for however short a time, so long as it is effective, is an arrest. The
following have been designated arrests: detention for questioning,33 a
forcible search of another's person,3 4 stopping a car by forcing it to the
side of the road,3 5 questioning a person under circumstances indicating
that the officers would not have let him escape.3 6 However, when an
officer merely questions a person, the courts find there has been no arrest.
37
Until recently the police of Philadelphia were instructed that an arrest
was "the taking into custody of another person under lawful authority [sic]
for the pflrpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge.
. . . Detaining a person for questioning, i.e., investigation, is not an
arrest." 38 Detention was not considered an arrest by the police because
they believed that "there must be a decision in the officer's mind to make
an arrest", that is to say, an intent to charge a person with the commission
of a crime. Dictum in one lower court case speaks of intent as a neces-
sary element of an arrest,39 but another Pennsylvania case specifically holds
that the actions of an officer can constitute an arrest even though he does
not so intend.40
Once it is determined that an arrest consists of any restraint of the
individual, it logically follows that the exact moment at which the arrest
takes place is that moment at which the restraint becomes complete. A
well-reasoned application of this principle is found in People v. Esposito.41
In that case an officer, becoming suspicious of the defendant, ordered him
to put up his hands, frisked him and found a gun. The officer asked the
defendant whether he had a license to carry the gun, and the answer was
no. The officer testified that he then placed the defendant under arrest.
Said the court: ". . . notwithstanding the statement of the officer of his
conclusion as to the legal significance and sequence of his acts, . . . it is
clear that the arrest happened before, or contemporaneously with, the search.
32. 342 U.S. 36, 46 (1951).
33. 1 ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 27, at 358, citing Bennett v. United States,
104 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Waite, Te Law of Arrest, 24 Trx. L. REv. 279, 296
(1946).
34. United States v. Clark, 29 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
35. Ramirez v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. 254, 58 S.W.2d 829 (1933).
36. Bonatz v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. 292, 212 S.W. 494 (1919).
37. E.g., State v. Gulczynski, 2 W.W. Harr. 120, 120 Atl. 88 (Del. 1922). Also
see Comment, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 311 (1938) and cases cited therein.
38. All quotations as to the instruction given the police are taken verbatim from
an Outline of the Law of Arrest used by instructors at the Police Academy of Phil-
adelphia.
39. See Com. v. Strickland, 71 D. & C. 104, 106 (Pa. 1950), citing 6 C.J.S.
571 (1937).
40. Com. v. Bothwell, 94 PiT'. L.J. 451 (Pa. 1946).
41. 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y. Supp. 326 (1922).
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It had inception when the officer told the defendant to put up his hands;
it was complete when the defendant obeyed and the officer put his hand
on him. The defendant was then in actual custody . . . and the subse-
quent declaration of arrest by the officer added nothing to that actual con-
dition. . . . Any restraint of liberty is an arrest." 42
POLICE PRACTICE: INFORMATION UPON WHICH POLICE ARREST
In order to ascertain the grounds upon which the Philadelphia police
make their arrests several sources of information were utilized. Police-
men of all ranks, judges, attorneys, and magistrates were interviewed.
Preliminary hearings held by magistrates in the Divisional Police Courts
were attended. At these proceedings persons arrested the previous day
are given hearings to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
warrant their being held for the grand jury. The arresting officers testify
as to the circumstances of the arrest and the evidence against the accused,
who is then given an opportunity to make a statement. A transcript of
all the testimony is taken and is available for reasonable public inspection.
43
Over 300 of these transcripts were examined. The daily newspapers and
files of organizations engaged in surveys of police activity were also scru-
tinized. One of the writers accompanied members of the Motor Bandit
Patrol on an eight-hour tour of duty.
The sources of information cannot be set forth with more particu-
larity because much of it was received in confidence. By far the greatest
portion of the data collected was furnished by the police themselves, who,
on this subject at least, are not unduly reticent. As a result of this in-
vestigation notes on 770 recent cases were compiled and were tabulated
according to the crimes involved. Those crimes for which arrests were
most frequently made have been selected for extensive discussion."
FELONY ARRESTS
Burglary.-Burglary is defined as willfully and maliciously entering
at any time any building 45 or vehicle 46 with the intent to commit any
felony. Ten of the thirty-five arrests for burglary that came to the writers'
attention would clearly seem to have been legal.47 These were cases where
persons were apprehended in some stage of the commission of the crime.
Several other arrests occurred after officers sped to an address in re-
sponse to a police radio report of a burglary and were able to locate the
42. Id. at 871, 194 N.Y. Supp. at 331. Accord: People v. Mirbelle, 276 Ill.
App. 533 (1934).
43. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 42 § 1141 (Purdon Supp. 1950).
44. With the exception of motor vehicle violations (78 arrests).
45. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4901 (Purdon 1945).
46. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4903 (Purdon 1945).
47. It should be borne in mind throughout this note that almost all of the arrests
which form the basis of this study were of the formal variety, culminating in a
"booking," or charging with a specific crime.
described suspects in the vicinity. Police who had received a call that
two boys had broken into a certain beer distributor's premises arrested two
boys in the vicinity who were running with a case of beer. A call to pick up
two men with a dog at a given address led to the arrest of two men
with a dog a block away. Sometimes the message contained no descrip-
tion of a suspect but merely directed the police to an address. The fact
that a person at the given address fled at the approach of the officers was
enough to bring about his arrest.
By far the most questionable arrests were those made on the basis
of "suspicious circumstances." Men were arrested for carrying a portable
radio late at night, for pushing a baby carriage late at night, for being
seen twice by the same officer in a neighborhood where burglaries are
frequent, and for running late at night. A negro in a well-to-do white
neighborhood was arrested because he was carrying a suitcase. 48 It is
true that in the cases just described a search of the baby carriage revealed
a large quantity of whiskey, the suitcase was found to contain sheets, and
the two men whose persons were searched were carrying burglary tools.
However, the result of a search cannot be taken into consideration in
determining the validity of an arrest which actually occurred before, or at
the moment, the search began. 49 Nor should it be assumed that the sus-
picions of the police are always strengthened as the result of a search.
When the search turns up nothing which the police think incriminating,
the suspect is released, and there is then no record of the arrest. When
the suspicions of the police are corroborated by the results of a search,
the suspect is usually charged with "suspicion of burglary." There is no
such crime as "suspicion of . . ." ro but the charge is often used 51 and
would seem to indicate that the police are unsure of their grounds.52
Occasionally arrests for burglary were based on accusations and tips
from pawnbrokers, victims, and accomplices. Arrests of this nature will
be discussed below.
Robbery.-Robbery is defined as the felonious and forcible taking of
goods or money from the person of another by violence or by putting
48. Likewise, white men' in negro sections are vulnerable to arrest, since they
are suspected of dope or liquor peddling.
49. People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 251 N.W. 788 (1933).
50. An arrest on general suspicion and not for a specific crime is illegal. People
v. Stern, 265 Mich. 610, 251 N.W. 788 (1933).
51. There were 245 arrests for suspicion in 1950 according to the Annual Report
of the Bureau of Police of Philadelphia.
52. Related to a charge of suspicion is an arrest for investigation. In one case
a person told an officer that he thought that the suspect was wearing a suit of clothes
that had been stolen from him. The officer charged the suspect with "investigation
of burglary." After the investigation was completed the charge was changed to
larceny and receiving stolen goods. The Washington Post of December 1, 1947,
quotes a leader of the District Bar: "Arrests for investigation are illegal arrests.
They have been uniformly condemned by . . . Federal courts as unlawful." The
Post found that in a 41-day period 1062 persons were arrested and charged with
investigation.
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him in fear.53  Thirty-two formal arrests for robbery were analyzed; the
great majority of them were probably lawful. In 10 of the cases the
suspect was apprehended in the act or immediately thereafter in hot pur-
suit, after the victim had set up a hue and cry. Almost as frequently,
arrests were made because the robbery victim gave the police a descrip-
tion of the culprit, who was later recognized at some location away from
the scene of the crime. Normally these descriptions are sent out over
the police teletype and radio and posted in every station house in the
city so that within twenty-four hours every officer knows that the person
answering that description is wanted on a felony charge.
As to the legality of these arrests, it has been stated by one authority
that official information, such as police photo'graphs, -offers of reward, and
radio descriptions, are presumed to be reliable.5 4 Information received
from a radio broadcast was held to furnish reasonable cause for arrest
without a warrant in a Wisconsin case.55 This rule seems sensible in
those cases where the broadcast includes a description of the offenders or
their car. Where no description is given and officers are merely directed
to a certain location, where someone is seen running, they have much less
basis for acting. Whether in this situation there exist reasonable grounds
for belief in guilt should depend upon additional factors, such as the time
of the occurrence, the type of neighborhood, and the appearance and dress
of the suspect. The mere observation of a man running should not fur-
nish grounds for the police to assume both that he is fleeing from them and
that he has committed the crime in question.
Occasionally the police will be given a description by an accomplice,
and the same procedure is followed. It has been held that information
from an accomplice, when not corroborated, does not justify an arrest
without a warrant.56 Yet in many cases uncorroborated information from
an accomplice is sent out over the police radio or teletype. This leads
to an anomalous situation. Assuming that a person arrested on the basis
of such information is illegally arrested, he has no recourse against the
arresting officer, who has acted on reasonable grounds--i.e., official in-
formation.57 Nor as a practical matter can the person arrested obtain
redress from the officer responsible for initiating the arrest, the one who
53. Com. v. Dantine, 261 Pa. 496, 104 Atl. 672 (1918). PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18
§§4704, 4705 (Purdon 1945) merely provides the penalty without defining the
crime.
54. 1 ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 27, at 444.
55. Scaffido v. State, 215 Wis. 389, 254 N.W. 651 (1934) (officers, acting on in-
formation given by a police radio broadcast concerning a felony committed by five auto-
mobile occupants, found the car in front of a restaurant and arrested five men in a
booth inside). Cf. Silver v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. App. 512, 8 S.W.2d 144 (1928)
(similar information by radio justifies search of automobile without warrant).
56. Isaacs v. Brand, 2 Stark 167 (Nisi Prius 1817), cited in Wills v. Jordan,
20 R.I. 630, 41 A. 233 (1898).
57. See text at notes 54 and 55 supra. Cf. U.S. v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716, 719
(3d Cir. 1951), where the court considers what was known to agent other than ar-
resting officer in determining legality of arrest. The court states that "a[n official]
telephone message cannot immunize irresponsible investigation."
accepted the information for transmission. The information passes through
too many hands to be traced to the one primarily at fault. Thus, in Penn-
sylvania the victim in effect has no remedy for his illegal arrest. How-
ever, he receives some measure of protection in the federal courts and
some state courts, because evidence gained through a search incident to an
unlawful arrest, a fruitful source of evidence in Pennsylvania, is excluded
in these jurisdictions. 58
In a number of cases the robber was known by his victim or later
recognized by him and pointed out to the police, who then made an arrest
on the basis of a definite accusation. That the officer has "authority to
arrest without a warrant upon reasonable suspicion, founded either on
his own knowledge or the information of others, that a felony has been
committed cannot be questioned." 59 The accusation, however, must be
from a credible person.00 One who has had opportunity for knowledge,
as the victim of a robbery, or who has made an investigation is such
a person.0 '
The most questionable arrest discovered in this area was a case wherein
a robbery victim could not identify his assailant but could describe the
articles of clothing that were stolen from him. When the police observed
two men in a taproom wearing jackets that matched the description of
those taken in the robbery, the men were arrested. It is submitted that
here the police acted prematurely. The hypothetical "cautious man" would
have sought more information before arresting. He might have placed the
suspects under surveillance, questioned their friends and neighbors, or
brought the one whose goods were stolen to view the suspected articles.
Larceny.-Larceny is the felonious taking and carrying away of the
personalty of another, and the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a
thing without claim of right, with the intention of converting it to a use
other than that of the owner without his consent.62  In almost 40% of
the total of 48 cases dealing with this felony the arrest was clearly legal,
usually because the culprit was caught in the act and in two cases because
of his admission fortified by corroborating evidence. Over half the cases
58. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and tables beginning on page 33.
59. Com. v. Rubin, 82 Pa. Super. 315, 321 (1923). See also McCarthy v.
De Armit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881) and Rarick v. McManomon, 17 Pa. Super. 154, 157
(1901).
60. McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881) (arrest on accusation of reputable
citizen and investigation held based on probable cause). Floating rumors are not an
adequate foundation for arrest. See Smith v. Ege, 52 Pa. 419, 422 (1866).
61. McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881), Smith v. Ege, 52 Pa. 419
(1866). In the Smith case there was reasonable grounds for belief of guilt based
on the representations of experienced detectives who had made an investigation.
Cf. Burk v. Howley, 179 Pa. 539, 36 Atl. 327 (1897) (arrest illegal because made on
the basis of an accusation by one who had no opportunity for knowledge). In Com.
ex rel. Spencer v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 442, 444, 71 A.2d 799, 801 (1950) the court implies
that arrest based on accusation by robbery victim is lawful.
62. Com. v. Quinn, 144 Pa. Super. 400, 19 A.2d 526 (1941). PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 18 § 4807 (Purdon 1945) provides the penalty without defining the crime.
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where the defendant was caught in the act involved shoplifting; the arrests
were made by store detectives.
Occasionally the arrest was made after the behavior of the defendant
aroused suspicion. Where the defendant with goods in his arms was seen
fleeing from a shopkeeper, the 'police obviously acted on reasonable
grounds. 3 However, the legality of other arrests in this category is more
dubious. In three cases, people were arrested because they were seen
driving a horse and wagon loaded with scrap metal. When one driver
told the officer he had obtained the scrap from the railroad, the police-
man did not bother to check to see whether he had permission to take it.
The officer "knew he didn't."
Numerous arrests were based on accusations. In larceny cases a new
factor often appears: instead of the accusation being followed immediately
by an arrest, as is normally the case with robbery, it may be followed by
a search of the dwelling of the accused. When the person of the suspect
is subjected to search without his consent, he is under such restraint that
the search constitutes an arrest. 4 The same is not true when the suspect's
residence is searched. It is not within the province of this note to enter
into an extensive discussion of the law of search and seizure; but when
searches and seizures become entwined with arrest practices, it becomes
necessary to state a few basic principles. There are only two ways in
which a search may be lawfully carried out. It may be authorized by a
search warrant.0 5 The use of search warrants in the cases examined was
virtually non-existent. Otherwise, a search is lawful if incident to a law-
ful arrest. An officer making a lawful arrest has the right to search the
person of the accused and the premises under his immediate control for
the fruits or facilities of the crime.66 The police are well aware of this
rule. The instructions given new officers in their indoctrination period
specify the following: "The arrest must precede the search. Police must
not use a search to discover a cause for an arrest." 0 7 Yet the Philadelphia
police in the past have made virtually no effort to observe this command;
they regularly use the search to turn up the evidence on which they base
their arrests. Even if an accusation alone does not furnish sufficient
grounds to arrest, if the police follow up the accusation with a search of
the suspect's dwelling which reveals stolen goods, they then have the
necessary reasonable grounds. Thus the police may legalize an arrest by
utilizing an illegal search, in which case the victim's only remedy is for
the illegal search. 8
63. An officer who sees one running at night pursued by another shouting, "Stop
thief !" has reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been committed. People
v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 37 P. 799 (1894).
64. U.S. v. Clark, 29 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
65. On requirements of search warrants see CARRINGER, op cit. supra note 3,
at 62.
66. Com. ex rel. Spencer v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 442, 445, 71 A.2d 799, 801 (1950).
67. See note 38 supra.
68. See text at note 163 et seq. infra.
A sizeable number of cases involve larceny of automobiles. Half
of these arrests stem from police broadcasts of license numbers to roving
squad cars. The arrest is frequently not effected without a chase and
attendant shooting which endangers the lives of the driver, policemen,
other motorists, and pedestrians. Some arrests for stolen cars are more
or less accidental. The police arrest a person for reckless driving or
speeding or lack of lights or an incorrect inspection sticker, and when
they make a routine check on the car, they find it has been reported stolen.
Finally, there is the group of cases where the arrest was initiated on the
most flimsy of grounds. An officer chased and apprehended a car be-
cause it was driven by a "known" car thief. Sometimes police stop cars
because they are driven by people who look as though they do not "belong"
in them. For example, a Negro in an expensive car was stopped. He
had no card or license, so he was taken to the station, i.e., arrested. His
story was that he had borrowed the car from a friend. When the friend
denied lending the car, he was formally "arrested." Another Negro was
stopped for no apparent reason, charged with "suspicion of larceny," and
released by the police when they satisfied themselves that the car was not
stolen. Four young boys in an expensive car were halted. The officer
found a quantity of hub caps in the trunk and charged them with larceny.
Drug Offenses.69-Mlost arrests for violations of this character are
made on the basis of tips from persons whose identity the police will not
divulge (e.g., informers), from anonymous persons, and from known per-
sons. The anonymous tips come from those interested in helping the drug
addict, from peddlers trying to drive their competitors out of business, and
from persons who bear a grudge against the person arrested. The known
accuser is usually a close relative, a neighbor, or an addict divulging the
identity of his supplier. As a result of these tips, the police may stop and
search the suspect the first time they see him. If they find nothing, they
search his dwelling without a warrant. If evidence of drug use is fotlnd
either on his person or in his dwelling, the police then for'mally "arrest"
him. On the other hand, the police may first search his dwelling and
then arrest the occupant or anyone who enters the premises during their
search. Persons so arrested are generally charged with suspicion of
illegal possession or use.
70
Analysis of the information relied upon by the police as a basis for
the above practices indicates that the informants may be scaled according
to reliability. In the field of robbery it was found that accusations by the
victim are generally considered highly trustworthy.71 In the drug cases,
information received from sources sympathetic to the addict also supports
an arrest where there are no circumstances known to the officers which cast
doubt on its reliability. Slightly less reliable than these informers, but
69. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35 §§ 821 et seq. (Purdon 1949).
70. See text at note 50 et seq. mtpra.
71. See text at note 61 supra.
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ranking well above the accomplice, are the neighbors of the addict and
professional police informers. If their information is supported by inde-
pendent police investigation, or if the informer is questioned as to the
basis of his statements, or if the police have dealt with the professional
informer for a long period of time and have always found him reliable,
such information will generally support an arrest7
2
Unlike accusations from known persons, the anonymous tip does not
alone afford the reasonable grounds required by the law in order to arrest
without a warrant; 73 but it is the officer's duty to investigate and to
arrest if and when the anonymous tip is confirmed by other circumstances
pointing toward guilt.74 How much more than the anonymous accusation
would justify an arrest is a matter for judicial inclusion and exclusion.75
The FBI operates in the main by using the technical, scientific and organi-
zational means at its disposal to build an iron-clad case.7e This system
stands in sharp contrast to the typical Philadelphia police practice of ar-
resting first and building a case later. It seems clear that the highly de-
sirable FBI practices are the result of the federal exclusionary rule of
evidence.
77
Many arrests for drug offenses are made because the behavior of a
person arouses suspicion. In such event, the police immediately search
the suspect for drugs and inspect his arms for marks left by hypodermic
injections. If nothing of this nature is found, he is released; otherwise
he is "booked." Illustrative of the circumstances which arouse the sus-
picion of the police are the following: two sailors in a doorway were
taking alterfiate puffs on a cigarette; a person reached in his pocket and
clapped his hand to his mouth; a man purchased paregoric (an opiate)
in a drugstore; one man gave money to another and received an object
in return; two boys ran at the approach of the police. Association with
72. E.g., Husty v. U.S., 282 U.S. 694, 700 (1930); U.S. v. Park Avenue
Pharmacy, 56 F.2d 753 (1932) ; 1 ALEXANDER, op. cit. spra note 27, at 444. Contra:
Patton v. State, 160 Miss. 274, 135 So. 352 (1931).
73. E.g., People v. Guertins, 224 Mich. 8, 194 N.W. 561 (1923); State v.
Bantam, 163 Wash. 598, 1 P.2d 861 (1931).
74. State v. Bantam, 163 Wash. 598, 1 P.2d 861 (1931) (anonymous tip giving
correct name and description of the accused and of his car and time of arrival at
place of arrest, confirmed by information received from sheriff). Accord: People
v. Ward, 226 Mich. 45, 196 N.W. 971 (1924) (where defendant for some time had
been suspected by officers of illegally engaging in liquor business, an anonymous
telephone call that he was in a certain car with suitcase full of whiskey justified
officer in arresting without a warrant when defendant refused to open suitcase for
officer's inspection).
75. "Whether such a belief [of guilt] is or is not reasonable depends upon the
reaction of the particular judge who makes the decision to the totality of the circum-
stances." Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 TEx. L. Rav. 279, 291 (1946). The writer
illustrates this statement by the experience of two defendants arrested together but
tried separately. On exactly the same evidence one judge ruled that there was rea-
sonable ground for the arrest, the other that there was not.
76. Note the extensive investigation made before arrest in U.S. v. Bianco, 189
F.2d 716. 718 (3d Cir. 1951).
77. See text at note 58 supra, and at note 189 infra.
a known peddler or user is considered suspicious. 78 One person was ar-
rested after police found drugs in his apartment, which they had raided
merely because they found his name in a notebook in the possession of a
suspect arrested the previous day. Another man was arrested simply
because the police "believed" a known user had visited him. Known.
drug addicts and those with a record of drug conviction are often searched
for no other reason. These people are called "police property" because
the police think they have a right to stop them at any time for a "check-
up." 79 Some policemen arrest people whom they claim to recognize as
addicts from their appearance. The symptoms of drug addiction listed by
these policemen are a vacant, glassy stare, watery eyes, running nose and
a demeanor which the police can only describe by saying, "he looks like
he thinks he's king," or "he floats along, walking on air." That drug
addicts can be recognized by these symptoms is disputed by competent
medical authority.8 0
The police were candid in admitting that they make numerous "spot
checks" (random arrests) in the "dope areas" of Philadelphia. It bears
reiteration that virtually all the cases which came to the attention of the
writers culminated in a formal arrest. It is impossible to know the
number of people stopped and searched--i.e., arrested-by the police but
not "taken in."
Completing the picture are occasional instances in which an arrest is
made because an addict confesses 81 and asks to be helped, and the more
frequent cases where the drug charge is added after a person is arrested
for some other crime and is found to possess drugs.
82
78. However, evidence that defendant had associated with known drug addicts
was held to form no basis for arrest, even in combination with evidence that he had
purchased narcotics in another state, had a general' reputation as a peddler, and had
been named as the source of supply by an addict. State v. Mullaney, 92 Mont. 553,
16 P.2d 407 (1932).
79. Proof of general reputation as a peddler of narcotics does not constitute
probable cause for arrest. State v. Mullaney, supra note 78.
80. One doctor informed the writers that the average addict who is receiving his
normal requirements of dope and has not received an overdose shows no symptoms
of his vice except contraction of the pupils. Only when a person has been a dope
addict for a very long period of time (and the doctor mentioned thirty years) does
he show pronounced signs, and even then they are not the ones the police mention.
Some of these symptoms are loss of weight, pale skin, moodiness of disposition,
emaciation, moral degeneracy. STEvEN, THE PRAcrIC OF MEDICINE 331-333 (3d
ed. 1932). The doctor adds that the above is true as to all habit-forming drugs
except marihuana, which sometimes produces unusual exhilaration leading to unin-
hibited acts.
81. An uncorroborated admission was held not to justify arrest in Wills v.
Jordan, 20 R.I. 630, 41 AtI. 233 (1898).
82. In all these cases, it should be noted that the police treat all drug offenses
as if they were felonies-i.e., as justifying arrest on reasonable grounds. That is not
the law. The Pennsylvania statutes make a distinction between cocaine and opium
offenses. (Heroin and other opium derivatives and marihuana are included in the
opium offenses.) The former are misdemeanors, the latter felonies. PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 35 §§ 825, 856, 865 (Purdon 1949). One doctor consulted by the writers stated
that cocaine addiction certainly exists in Philadelphia and that cocaine may be taken
by a needle, which leaves marks like those produced by an injection of an opium
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MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS
Numbers.Y---Of 141 numbers arrests, approximately one-third were
based on observation by the police of activities appearing to be part of the
pattern of numbers writing, and hence arousing suspicion. Many of the
operators conduct their businesses on street corners. The numbers player
will approach his writer, hand him a small sum of money and tell him
what number he wishes to play. The writer may make a notation of the
number, or he may memorize as many numbers as he can and then seek
the solitude of an apartment house lobby or the front porch of a house
to write them down. In some instances the writer may have those who
wish to gamble with him come to his residence or place of business. A
method used by many numbers writers to escape detection is to visit the
player daily at his residence. These various means are known to the police,
and hence they become suspicious when they observe a person making
brief calls at various houses in a neighborhood, especially if the person
does not appear to be a salesman. If the same houses are revisited on a
subsequent day, the possibility that the caller may be a legitimate sales-
man or canvasser is thought to be negatived.
The police, after first having their attention drawn to any part of this
sequence of events, will usually observe the suspect for a short period
to see whether the pattern is repeated. In most cases the police do not
actually see money changing hands, for that part of the transaction is kept
as secret as possible.84 Even if money is seen passing from one person
to another, this does not establish that the recipient is a numbers writer.
To obtain evidence that what they have observed was criminal, the police
search the suspect, his residence, his automobile or the area in which he
was standing. However, the need for a search is greatly lessened in cases
where a nervous suspect runs at the approach of the police or attempts
to destroy what turns out to be evidence of numbers writing. Either of
substance. It is therefore impossible for a police officer to distinguish between cocaine
and opium offenses for the purpose of deciding whether he may legally make an
arrest based only on reasonable belief in guilt.
83. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 §§4601, 4602 (Purdon 1945).
84. In four of the cases examined, police in plainclothes did manage to win the
confidence of the suspect and place bets with him or hear him accept bets.
The police say that they often get the suspect to admit that he is a numbers
writer. The method is illustrated by the following case. A police officer observed
numerous persons entering a shoe-shine parlor and leaving in a few minutes. The
officer entered the shop and saw the defendant behind a counter, writing in a book.
The officer asked, "All right, who backs you?" The defendant answered auto-
matically, "Nobody. I back them myself." The defendant was observing the code
of behavior followed by all numbers writers of never telling the name of the numbers
banker for whom he works. It is so simple to say that he is his own banker and
thus avoid "squealing" on the higher-ups (who are expected to furnish quick bail
and pay all fines) that many suspects will fall into this trap, according to the police.
However, the bail bondsmen who are always found in the vicinity of the Central
Police Court in City Hall say this is untrue. They state, very positively, that
suspected numbers writers will not admit anything-that they simply will not talk.
They also say that the stereotyped police testimony that "the defendant admitted he
had been writing numbers for a short time and that he received a 25% commission"
is also faked.
these courses of conduct is considered by the police to be tantamount to
an admission.
In the remaining arrests for numbers offenses the police received prior
information from a third party concerning either the suspect himself
or a certain address where he was found. In all of these cases it was
the tip or complaint which initially caused police action. According to
the police, the majority of the tips come from rival numbers writers, while
complaints usually come from indignant neighbors or relatives of the
offender. Occasionally, an employer will call the police when he has
information that numbers writers are active at his establishment. After
receiving a tip that they will find numbers at a certain address, the police
usually go there immediately and "gain admittance." This may mean
that the police knocked on the door of the premises and were admitted;
or perhaps, as is often claimed, that the police found the door unlocked or
even wide open, and merely walked inside. It may mean, as members of
the force have candidly admitted, that the police knocked the door from
its hinges. Or finally, the police may have gained admittance by climbing
a fire escape and breaking a second story window or skylight, or they
may have cut a screen door with wire clippers, or forced a cellar window,
or required a landlady to open the door of a tenant's room.
Once inside, the police may observe the suspect tabulating numbers
plays, or see him trying to dispose of evidence; or without seeing such
activity, they may search any persons found on the premises, or the prem-
ises may be searched. The police may, while on the premises, answer
phone calls and accept bets. All of the paraphernalia is seized and those
who are found at the location are arrested and charged with setting up
and maintaining an illegal lottery. Another common practice is to watch
a suspected location and stop everyone entering or leaving. If evidence of
numbers writing is found on their persons they are formally "arrested"
and the police will continue to watch the premises. If no evidence is dis-
covered by such search, the police will then order the person to take them
inside the suspected place, where a search for evidence will be made.
One defense that is often put forth by a suspect when first confronted
with evidence of numbers found upon his person or in his residence is that
he is going to play those numbers himself. That activity is not illegal.8s
There are no statistics showing how often this claim is successful in pre-
venting a "booking"; however, in approximately half the cases examined,
the claim was made and disbelieved. The credibility of such a claim is
weakened by the presence of a large number of tabulated plays in the pos-
session of the suspect, or a repetition of the same number among those
plays. Similarly, if the police know that the suspect has a record of past
lottery convictions, his plea will not be given credence; for here, too, cer-
tain persons are considered "police property" and receive special treatment.
They are followed and frequently searched at random. Persons in their
company are often subjected to the same treatment. In one case, the
85. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4602 (Purdon 1945).
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arresting officer testified that he acted under standing orders from a police
inspector to arrest the defendant on a charge of being a common gambler I6
every time he was seen in the central city area, because the inspector knew,
but could not prove, that he was a numbers bankers
7
The validity of a misdemeanor arrest without a warrant depends on
whether the offense was committed in the presence of the officer.88 The
chief difficulty is a determination of what acts constitute the offense, how
much of the offense must be seen by the officer, and how certain the officer
must be that an offense is being committed in his presence. The Penn-
sylvania statute provides that "whoever . . . erects, sets up, opens, makes
or draws any lottery, or is in any way concerned in the managing, conduct-
ing or carrying on of the same, is guilty of a misdemeanor.. . 89 Thus
it would seem that any single act connected with the carrying on of a
lottery is a crime. Even if this were not so, the law requires only that the
greater portion of a series of acts which together make up a misdemeanor
be committed in the presence of the officer, to enable him to arrest without
warrant.90 The most controversial question is whether the officer must
actually know that the offense is being committed in his presence. A few
jurisdictions seem to require knowledge. 91 A Pennsylvania court, on the
other hand, has stated that ". . . it is not essential that . . . the officer
must absolutely know that an offense is being committed. He must believe
that it is being done, and must believe it on the evidence of his own
senses. . . .9 Under this rule arrests of suspects observed following
the modus operandi of numbers writers are legal. Though it has been
carelessly stated in dictum in Pennsylvania cases that the officer's belief
may be founded on either observation or reliable information, 93 it is ap-
parently well settled that the information must be received by the officer
through the use of his senses alone.
94
Maintaining a Gambling House, Pool Selling and Book Making:-
The practices of the police in making arrests for other gambling offenses
are similar to the practices used in arresting for numbers offenses. A
86. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4603 (Purdon 1945).
87. In another case the writers heard the Captain of the Vice Squad tell a magis-
trate, who had just freed a group of men charged with breach of the peace and dis-
orderly conduct of betting in Shibe Park, that he would instruct his officers to ar-
rest the defendants every time they were found at the ball park, even though the
charges wouldn't "stick," and that the money which had been confiscated from them
would not be refunded.
88. See text ft note 18 et seq. supra.
89. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4601 (Purdon 1945).
90. See State v. Lutz, 85 W. Va. 330, 344, 101 S.E. 434, 439 (1919); 1
ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 27, at 446.
91. E.g., Keith v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 168, 235 Pac. 631 (1925); Hughes
v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 570, 238 S.W. 588, 595 (1922).
92. Com. v. Reynolds, 4 D. & C. 262, 265 (Pa. 1923) (emphasis added).
93. See Com. v. Rubin, 82 Pa. Super. 315, 324 (1923); Com. v. Sullivan, 91
Pa. Super. 544, 547 (1927).
94. See text at note 92 supra. See Justice Stern concurring in Com. v. Truitt,
369 Pa. 72, 88, 85 A.2d 425, 432 (1951).
recital of "suspicious circumstances" which have led to arrests for pool
selling and book making 5 demonstrates that the police act without an
offense being committed in their presence. (It should be noted that book-
ing of bets is a crime, betting is not.) A man was seen buying an Arm-
strong race sheet and marking it; two men stood on a street corner match-
ing their Armstrong selections; two men were observed meeting on a
parking lot; an officer saw a man take a piece of paper from a passerby
and hand it to a woman who slipped the paper into the diaper of a baby
she was holding. In another case, an officer observed numerous persons
entering and leaving a house. He entered the premises and found a man
listening to horse race results and marking them on a sheet of paper.
In cases where tips, complaints, or accusations are furnished, much
illegal police activity is also found. Arrests were made, without a warrant,
of persons merely accused of being bookies. Even more frequently; police
raid houses and arrest the occupants on the basis of evidence found during
an illegal search.
For the crime of keeping and maintaining a gambling house,9 6 over
85% of the arrests were preceded by an illegal entry upon private property.
In this class of cases the police action is almost always initiated on the com-
plaint of an irate citizen. In a typical case, police officers were dispatched
to the house complained of and gained admittance by ringing the doorbell
and pushing their way past the person who answered. Once inside, the
officers observed a group of men sitting about a table with cards and money
on it, and arrested all present. The owner of the house was charged with
the principal offense and the players with breach of the peace and dis-
orderly conduct.
9 7
In two cases it was argued that gambling took place in the presence
of the arresting officer. In one, the officer, as he walked past a house, heard
the characteristic sounds of rolling dice; in the other, the officer saw
through an uncurtained window a group .of people playing Mah Jong.
After gaining admittance to the first house the officer found money on a
crap table; in the other instance only chips were discovered. In neither
case had the officer any right to enter the houses to determine whether what
he had seen or heard was a crime.93
Liquor Violations: 9 -- In this area, which includes such offenses as
manufacturing, possessing or selling untaxed liquor, running an unlicensed
speakeasy, serving drinks after hours, and serving minors or intoxicated
persons, the police practice is similar to that in the area of gambling arrests.
However, in liquor violation cases, the police often need not effect illegal
entry to obtain evidence, since they need not procure a warrant to legalize
95. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4607 (Purdon 1945).
96. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4605 (Purdon 1945).
97. See text at notes 107, 108 infra.
98. Com. v. Eyre, 1 S. & R. 346 (Pa. 1815) ; Com. v. Krubeck, 23 Pa. C. C.
35 (1899).
99. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 47 §§ 140, 321, 744-602 (Purdon 1941).
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their entry into a public drinking establishment. This does not hold true
for a speakeasy, whece there is no general invitation to the public. But
here the police often obtain by trickery an invitation to enter.
Of the 63 arrests examined, only 16 were based on observed suspicious
activity of the arrested party, and only two of these were clearly lejal
(officers in plain clothes bought untaxed liquor from the suspect and thus
saw the offense committed before making the arrest). The more question-
able arrests were based on such circumstances as the following: officers saw
persons walking down the street carrying bottles, bags, or other con-
tainers; 100 the police observed many persons entering and leaving locations
which proved to be speakeasies or unlicensed stores for selling bottled un-
taxed liquor; officers observed a man hiding behind a fence; a minor was
seen carrying beer cans away from a store. In each of these cases sus-
picions may reasonably have been aroused, but without more an arrest could
not be justified. The additional information was discovered by means of
a search without consent.
The 47 other arrests were made as a result of some kind of information
which directed the attention of the police to a certain location. As in the
case of gambling offenses, the police "gained admittance" and searched until
they found the liquor. Obviously, if the police find untaxed liquor in a
private apartment, the crime of possessing it has been committed in their
presence by some one of the occupants; 101 however, in order to put them-
selves in the position of seeing a misdemeanor being committed the police
have engaged in a prior illegal entry and search.
Prostitution:-Prostitution is offering or using the body for sexual
intercourse for hire.10 2 Whoever uses any place for prostitution or permits
any place to be used or aids or abets in an act of prostitution is guilty of
a misdemeanor. 10 3 In the majority of cases under this heading, plainclothes
officers have been solicited, usually in a taproom, by a girl or her male
procurer. Thus, there is no doubt that the misdemeanor occurred in the
presence of the officers. Most of the remaining cases were arrests of
"madams" and procurers implicated by arrested prostitutes or their patrons.
These were clearly illegal under the rules for arrests without warrants for
a misdemeanor. In a few cases, the arrest was based on finding a man and
woman in compromising circumstances after the officer had made an illegal
entry into the premises. While raiding a house for liquor, an officer found
a couple partially disrobed. In another case, the officer's suspicions were
aroused when he saw a white man and a colored, girl together late at night.
He followed them as they took a devious route to a house. Gaining admis-
sion shortly after they entered, he found them partially disrobed. The girl
100. Such misdemeanor arrests were upheld in U.S. v. Snyder, 278 Fed. 650
(N.D. W. Va. 1922) and Baldwin v. State, 175 Miss. 316, 167 So. 61 (1936).
101. See Com. v. Martin, 125 Pa. Super. 104, 189 Atl. 500 (1937) for construction
of word "possession."
102. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4103 (Purdon 1945).
103. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4512 (Purdon 1945).
was arrested for prostitution and the man was charged with disorderly
conduct.
Assault and Battery:-Although assault, assault and battery, and ag-
gravated assault and battery are all misdemeanors, 10 4 only 25% of these
offenses were committed within the view of the arresting officer. Most
of these were cases of alleged assault and battery on the officer himself.10 5
The remaining 75% of these arrests were made on accusations, sometimes
fortified by such external evidence as conspicuous injuries or the flight of
the accused. However, these arrests clearly do not measure up to the re-
quirement that the officer observe the commission of the offense. In two
cases, the officer investigated a reported disturbance in an apartment, and
found there a person with an injured eye. He thereupon arrested the only
other person in the room. Though the officer had arrested the logical
person, the arrest was illegal.' 0 6
Disorderly Conduct and Breach of the Peace.-Disorderly conduct is
defined as wilfully making or causing to be made any loud, boisterous and
unseemly noise or disturbance to the annoyance of the peaceable residents
nearby, or near to any public thoroughfare, whereby the public peace is
broken or the traveling public annoyed.'0 7 Breach of the peace is not de-
fined in the statutes but "is an offense well known to the common law. It
is a disturbance of public order by an act of violence or by any act likely to
produce violence . . . 'Disorderly conduct' is a broader term than breach
of the peace and disorderly conduct is not always a breach of the peace,
as where it is merely calculated to disturb or annoy"; 108 but for the purpose
of arresting and booking, the two are used interchangeably. One-third of
the cases in this area were for activity seen by the officer-fighting,
rioting, starting commotions upon the arrest of others, etc.. These would
all seem to be legal arrests. There are isolated cases of arrests on accusa-
tions. which, of course, are illegal.
Three-quarters of the arrests for disorderly conduct appear to be
illegal, in that the charge is used to cover lawful conduct of which the police
disapprove. In liquor, gambling or prostitution raids, the usual police
104. PA. STAT. AxN., tit. 18 §§ 4708, 4709 (Purdon 1945).
105. The term "alleged" is used because some of these may have been cases of
permissible resistance to unlawful police activity. According to one account of such
a case, plainclothes officers had thrust their way into a woman's house. Thinking
they were thugs, the woman threatened to call the police as she pushed them out.
Instead, she found herself under arrest. In other cases there is very serious doubt
as to whether the accused, who appeared to have been beaten, had assaulted the
officer or whether the officer had beaten the accused and trumped up an assault and
battery charge to justify the beating. On the right to resist an unlawful arrest see
Brooks v. Com., 61 Pa. 352 (1869) ; Com. v. Doe, 109 Pa. Super. 187, 167 AtI. 241
(1933); Com. v. Bryant, 9 Phila. 595 (1872); Com. v. Jayne, 32 Pa. C.C. 126
(1906) ; Com. v. Cosler, 8 Kulp 97 (Luzerne Co., Pa. 1895) ; Com. v. Stirk, 5 Lanc.
415 (Pa. 1888).
106. Unless the case is governed by Com. v. Cosler, 8 Kulp 97 (Luzerne Co.,
Pa. 1895), which holds that the officer's arrival at the scene immediately after the
altercation is sufficient. See text at note 23 supra.
107. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4406 (Purdon 1945).
108. Com. v. Sherman, 4 D. & C. 12 (Pa. 1930).
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practice seems to be to charge all customers found in the establishment with
disorderly conduct. No case examined showed any evidence of disorderly
conduct on the part of any of these people, and invariably they were dis-
charged by magistrates. One reason the police arrest everybody caught in
their net is the feeling among members of the force that the greater the
number of arrests, the more likely their superiors and the public will think
they are doing an efficient job. Instances have been reported where mixed
groups of whites and Negroes have been arrested simply because of their
fraternization. 1 9 A Negro girl with a white boy-friend stated that she was
told to pay a certain member of the vice squad $100 if she wished to avoid
arrest every time he saw her. She refused to comply and was picked up
twice, once being formally booked for disorderly conduct.110 The charge
has been used against members of the Progressive Party, allegedly for no
other reason than their party affiliation, or that they met in mixed groups,'
Negroes who assert their rights against the police apparently do so in
some cases at the risk of arrest. According to the records of one organiza-
tion, arrests of Negroes for disorderly conduct have been made solely for
such reasons as :protesting, at the police station, an illegal entry and beat-
ing; objecting to an unauthorized search of the person and to being struck;
or inquiring why a friend was in the police wagon.1 2 Nor are white people
immune. The writers spoke to a man and wife in City Hall who were
protesting the husband's arrest to one of the Superintendents of Police.
According to their story, the husband had called the police'because his
neighbors had been drunk, noisy, and insulting to his wife. The officer
who responded to the call told him to swear out a warrant. The husband
said, "You mean you can't arrest people who have called my wife such
awful names?" The officer repeated that he could not arrest without a
warrant. The husband then told his wife to remember the officer's num-
ber. For this he was arrested.
Two cases examined by the writers illustrate further how the charge
of disorderly conduct has been abused. In one case, a well-known gambler
was charged with this misdemeanor because he ran across the street when
a policeman called to him. In another, a material witness was booked on
disorderly conduct admittedly to insure his appearance at a hearing. The
officer testified that "there was nothing on him" but he had "just wanted
to make sure the fellow showed up at the hearing."
109. The information compiled about these disorderly conduct arrests may not rep-
resent typical police practice. Most of the cases involving abuse of the rights of
Negroes were taken from the files of the N.A.A.C.P., Philadelphia branch, which was
seeking information on such cases. However, in 1950 there were 10,356 arrests for
disorderly conduct in Philadelphia, far more than for any other crime except drunken-
ness (37,546). A practice which makes up even a very small percentage of 10,356
arrests is significant.
110. From the legal files of the N.A.A.C.P., Philadelphia branch.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid. It is a common belief among policemen that anyone who talks back
to them is committing a breach of the peace.
GENERAL PRACTICES
In addition to the police practice set out above in specific areas of
crime, there are a number of general arrest practices which pervade all
fields. Most of these have already been mentioned in passing.
Frisking:-Frisking is passing the hands over the outer clothing of a
person to make sure that he has no dangerous weapons concealed on his
body." 3 . It is a practice engaged in by a police officer every time he ap-
proaches, for questioning or arrest, a person he thinks may be dangerous.
In one instance observed, a police car was sent to check on a reported
shooting. When the police arrived at the address given, a well-dressed
Negro approached the car and stated that he had been in a bar when a man
came in and started to "shoot up the place." One officer got out of the car
and roughly frisked the complainant, who protested that he was not used
to such treatment. Nothing was found on him, but he was pushed into the
car and driven around the block, the officer claiming that the Negro could
identify the person who had been shooting. When the Negro insisted that
he did not know the man, he was told to get out of the car. The officer
then remarked, "You can't treat them with kid gloves."
According to one police sergeant, frisking is a safety-first procedure-
a defensive measure. It is not a search (if it were, it would be illegal)
because it is merely "feeling an inch deep for objects." The sergeant
attributed the authority for frisking to custom. He conceded that there is
nothing in the written law which legalizes it. One veteran officer, admitting
that frisking is illegal, advocated the use of police "dodges" (tricks)
instead." 4
No case was discovered in which a court decided whether or not frisk-
ing is an arrest. But there are decisions on the legality of the practice.
One Pennsylvania case expressly declares frisking illegal. In Common-
wealth v. Balanzo 115 the court says: ". . . it being admitted that there
was no warrant against the prisoner or any of his companions, the at-
tempted search of the prisoners for weapons was an unlawful act . ."
The other side of the picture was expressed by a lower court judge in
Commonwealth v. Reynolds." In a case where officers frisked four
"suspicious characters" coming out of a restaurant because one of them
looked like a man wanted by the police for robbery, the court commented:
"It has never been held that, under such circumstances as arose here,"
7
113. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 324 (1942).
114. Such as feeling for a shoulder holster in the guise of admiring a suspect's
tie, or probing for hidden weapons while brushing a speck of lint from the suspect's
coat.
115. 261 Pa. 507, 510, 104 At. 683, 684 (1918).
116. 4 D. & C. 262 (Pa. 1923).
117. The court was not proceeding on the theory that the officer was conducting
a search incident to a lawful arrest for a felony. In any case it is doubtful whether
personal resemblance justifies arrest without a warrant. See 5 C.J. 417 n.l(e)
(1916) and cases cited therein.
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the officer is compelled to swear out a search warrant before searching the
person for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not he is carrying con-
cealed deadly weapons. We apprehend that, if the law requires that, per-
sons who carry concealed deadly weapons would rarely be apprehended." 118
The Uniform Arrest Act agrees with the latter view. It provides that
''a peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he
has stopped or detained to question [which is permitted by the Act to a
limited extent] 119 whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that he is
in danger if the person possesses a weapon." 120 The drafters of this Act
admit that the above section will not have any effect on police practice,
since police will continue to be go' erned by the instinct for self-preserva-
tion, which motivates frisking, whether or not the practice is legal. But
they mention several advantages to be gained from legalizing the frisk,
chiefly that respect for law will thereby be created in the officer and that
evidence obtained from a frisk will be admissible in those jurisdictions
which exclude evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search.
12 1
Several high-ranking officers were strongly opposed to giving the police
the right to frisk. Their feelings were that the police now frisk in the main
only when it is reasonable, but that many officers would carry this practice
to extremes if it were legalized to any extent. But it seems desirable that
frisking be legalized in reasonable circumstances-where an officer rea-
sonably believes that he is in danger-and that there be sanctions set up
and used when the officer abuses his powers. It is submitted that police
respect for law and obedience to it are best engendered when the law is
reasonably attuned to police needs. If the law can achieve that sensible
state, there can be no complaint if effective sanctions are imposed upon
those who exceed their authority. Further, if an officer acts in a legal
manner, the citizen is less likely to be offended and will be more willing
to cooperate with the police in the future.
Detention for Interrogation is a prevalent practice, on which no figures
are available. Though it constitutes an arrest, 2 2 persons detained are not
booked and do not appear before a magistrate, so no record is kept of
such cases. The practice of the Philadelphia police, according to one officer,
is as follows: If the matter involved is a serious one, the individual is held
in a cell, though not incommunicado. On less serious matters, he is not
locked up. He is questioned, sometimes extensively. He is either searched
or ordered to empty his pockets. On serious crimes, detention may con-
tinue for several hours. The same officer offered an example of how
detention is employed. "When a man is carrying a portable radio late at
night and won't talk to the officer who questions him about it, he needs
118. Com. v. Reynolds, 4 D. & C. 262, 264 (Pa. 1923). Accord: Gisske v.
Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 16, 98 Pac. 43, 44 (1908).
119. Section 2, 28 VA. L. REv. 344 (1942).
120. Section 3, 28 VA. L. Rv. 344 (1942).
121. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rsv. 315, 325 (1942).
122. See text at notes 27 et seq. supra.
detention and interrogation; he can't be arrested because he may be
innocent !"
In one case observed, officers in a prowl car heard the sound of an
automobile crash. Upon investigation they found that a driver had scraped
two cars. He had no license, money or identification. He was frisked and
then put in the police car. The driver said that a friend of his had asked
him to park the car. While the police were checking on his story in the
station-house, the suspect was told to sit in the office. His friend confirmed
the fact that he had given permission to park the car and the suspect was
released.
One officer who professed his opposition to detention and interrogation
advocated the use of "dodges." He gave two examples: first, a request for
voluntary cooperation (The policeman says, "Will you please step down to
the station-house so we can investigate your background ?" and the suspect
usually complies because he thinks he must) ; second, the "vagrancy dodge"
(The officer sees a suspicious person in a well-to-do neighborhood late at
night; if the suspect will not explain his presence, the officer arrests him
"on some such ground as vagrancy" 123).
Stopping on the Street:-Related to detention in the police station is
the common practice of stopping a suspect on the street for questioning. If
the answers received are considered adequate by the officer, the man will
be sent on his way. But if his answers are unsatisfactory, he will be taken
to the police station and detained for further questioning and investigation.
While a person has a right not to answer questions put to him by an
officer, evasive replies or failure to answer are considered by the police to
be strong evidence of guilt of something. This is perhaps not an unreason-
able belief on the part of the police in view of the fact that, in their experi-
ence, innocent people normally respond readily to their questions. How-
ever, the police have no right to act on the theory (expressed by one officer)
that mere lack of cooperation is a reasonable ground for arrest.'2
The Round-up is a spectacular species of detention and interrogation.
A recent example occurred in connection with Philadelphia's notorious
DiCriscio taxi slaying, where the police raided various homes and, in one
night, rounded up more than thirty teen-age negro suspects who were taken
to the station-house and intensively questioned without being booked.1
25
Those who satisfied the police of their innocence were released. Out of
this group, three ultimately confessed to the killing.
Police see nothing wrong in using the round-up, especially in in-
vestigations of the more heinous crimes. They concede that it is not legal
unless an officer has reasonable grounds to take thirty men into custody
when he knows that only a few, if any, are guilty. To state this proposi-
tion is to refute it.
123. Vagrancy is a statutory crime, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 2032 et seq.
(Purdon 1945), which can easily be abused.
124. As to whether stopping is an arrest, see text at note 37 supra.
125. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Nov. i9, 1951, p. 3.
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The use of the round-up is not confined to sensational crimes of intense
public interest. In one larceny case examined, the police, acting on a
description furnished by the victim, rounded up a number of men answer-
ing to that description and lined them up before the victim, who identified
one as the thief.
The round-up is utilized not only when the police are attempting to
solve a particular crime but also when they are attempting to stamp out a
itcrime wave" in a neighborhood. In 1942 the citizens of one section of
Philadelphia wer being terrorized by criminals who practically every night
committed at least one serious crime of violence. The police were occa-
sionally able to trace the culprits to two poolrooms and a taproom, but
could not pick them out of the crowds which habitually congregated there.
Early one morning the police simultaneously raided these three establish-
ments and moved every person found therein to the station-house for
"screening." It took the police two days to investigate the 300 persons
taken into custody. Those who could prove they were regularly employed
were immediately released. From the remainder the police culled enough
knives and guns to fill several baskets. A dozen of the men were known
criminals, wanted for major crimes. It is reported that the crime rate in
this locality during the next 60 days dropped 80% in the case of the most
serious crimes and 50% generally. When this activity was reported to the
Justice Department as a flagrant violation of constitutional rights, an in-
vestigation was made. The conclusion of the U. S. Attorney was that
prosecution would be useless, since no jury would ever convict the
officers.1
26
The police do not attempt to justify this species of round-up by a claim
that they acted on reasonable grounds. They do say that anyone who
enters a place which is a "hotbed of crime" assumes the risk of being
arrested, and they point with pride to the effectiveness of such procedure.
No one disputes the illegality of the round-up, but it is argued that the
results cannot be achieved without it. However, good police work within
the law probably would be as successful in the long run. Though results
would come with less dispatch, they would be achieved with far less harass-
ment of the innocent. The end of the criminal law is not maximum effec-
tiveness but rather the maximum amount of effectiveness consonant with
maximum protection of the individual.
AVAILABLE REMEDIES FOR ILLEGAL ARREST
Consideration of the foregoing material reveals two important facts:
(1) the police in Philadelphia are in many cases arresting without sufficient
information, and (2) even when they do have the information requiied by
law for a legal arrest, it has often been gained by illegal means, notably the
illegal search. The amount of illegality discovered is perhaps startling in
view of the facts that chiefly formal arrests were studied, which generally
126. This episode was related by James F. Ryan, Esq., Assistant City Solicitor.
are far more commendable than the informal types, and that the bulk of
information gathered was derived from police sources, which probably
present police practice in'its most favorable light.
Because the illegal arrest is not as spectacular as certain other police
practices, it receives less notoriety. Yet it is more deserving of public
attention and condemnation because it affects a much larger segment of the
population than does third degree, extortion, and the like. One outgrowth
of the lack of publicity is the general unawareness of the remedies, direct
or indirect, available for an illegal arrest.
Direct Attacks.-After an indictment has been returned against a de-
fendant it is too late for him to challenge the legality of his arrest by any
procedure-whether a motion to quash the indictment, 127 a motion in arrest
of judgment,128 a rule to show cause why he should not be discharged, 29 or
a motion to quash the return of the magistrate. 3 0 The leading Pennsyl-
vania case to state this rule is Commonwealth v. Brennan,'3' where the
Court* refused to quash an indictment for lack of an information saying,
"While the defendant might have been heard . . . upon a proceeding
to be discharged from custody, 3 2 . . . it is certainly too late after indict-
ment found. . . ." "s Five years later, in the case of Commonwealth v.
Dingman,3 4 where the court also refused to quash an indictment for de-
fects in the information, the court stated that, "The defendant might have
raised any question touching the legality of his arrest upon a proceeding
to be discharged from custody, but having given bail to answer the
charge 1'5 he could not after indictment found raise such questions by a
motion to quash," and cited the Brennan case as authority.13 6 Apparently
from this gratuitous mention of bail,' 37 the rule has become firmly estab-
127. E.g., Com. v. Brennan, 193 Pa. 567, 44 At. 498 (1899) ; Com. v. Dingrnan,
26 Pa. Super. 615 (1904) ; Con. v. Fedulla, 89 Pa. Super. 244 (1926).
128. Com. v. Geibel, 13 D. & C. 115 (Pa. 1929); Com. v. Gosnell, 24 Dist.
426 (Pa. 1914).
129. Com. v. Sullivan, 91 Pa. Super. 544 (1927).
130. Com. v. Wideman, 150 Pa. Super. 524, 28 A.2d 801 (1942) ; Com. v. Kipnis,
26 Dist. 927 (Pa. 1917). In both cases bail was held to have waived defects in
arrest; a fortiori return of indictment would foreclose challenge, since it is a later
proceeding than bail.
131. 193 Pa. 567, 44 AtI. 498 (1899).
132. "There are many appellate court cases which hold [sic] that a defendant
may move for discharge from recognizance or from confinement for irregularities
in his arrest: Com. v. Brennan. . . . In none of these cases or in any other appel-
late court cases that we have found was defendant actually discharged for that rea-
son, after his guilt had been established. Either the application for discharge came
after indictment found, or, on the merits, defendant was not entitled to discharge."
Corn. ex reL. Althouse v. Dressel, 72 D. & C. 19, 20 (Pa. 1949).
133. Com. v. Brennan, 193 Pa. 567, 569, 44 Atl. 498 (1899).
134. 26 Pa. Super. 615 (1904).
135. Emphasis supplied.
136. Com. v. Dingman, 26 Pa. Super. 615, 619 (1904).
137. Talk of bail was superfluous in view of the fact that indictment had been
found.
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lished that the entry of bail alone, without the return of an indictment, fore-
closes the defendant from challenging the legality of his arrest.138
Apparently the only possible plan of attack for an illegally arrested
defendant is to bring a petition for habeas corpus and not post bail, a drastic
course of action. While at one time it was the rule of the Pennsylvania
courts that the irregularity of the proceedings under which a defendant
was held would warrant granting the petition,'139 it has long since become
established that the court will deny the petition despite irregularities, so
long as the Commonwealth makes out a prima facie case as to the guilt of
the accused.. 40
In general, then, a defendant cannot avoid going to trial, though-
illegally arrested. Yet an occasional case will arise where a magistrate, in
response either to his personal inclinations or political pressure, will dis-
charge a man simply because he has been illegally arrested-to the anger
of the police, who quickly rearrest with a warrant.
In -one- recent case reported in the daily papers a quarter sessions
court granted a petition for "release from recognizance and discharge with-
out day" after indictment on the grounds that the arrest was illegal.
141
According to the attorney for the defendant, the authority for his pro-
cedure was Commonwealth v. Greenberg.'4 But, in that case the court
affirmed a denial of such a petition which had been sought after entry of
bail but before indictment, on two grounds: (1) the dismissal of the peti-
tion below was not a final judgment from which appeal could lie and (2)
defendant averred no injury. In another case where the same petition was
brought, also before indictment, the court denied the petition because de-
fendant had entered bail.143 The only conclusion that can be drawn from
this contradictory collection of authority is that this petition is the best
direct avenue open to the defendant. Here, at least, the law has not
crystallized against him.
Civil Suits Against Officers.-Philadelphia police have little to fear
from civil suits for false arrest, unlawful imprisonment, and the like. This
is not because of any inherent defect in the remedy itself. Indeed, once the
plaintiff proves the fact of his arrest, the burden shifts to the officer to
138. Com. v. Wideman, 150 Pa. Super. 524, 28 A.2d 801 (1942) ; Com. v.
Kreisher, 79 Pa. Super. 428 (1922) ; Com. v. Marzano, 9 D. & C. 764 (Pa. 1927) ;
Com. v. Kipnis, 26 Dist. 927 (Pa. 1917). One reason given is that after having
entered bail "defendants are then held by force of the recognizances, and not by
virtue of the arrests." Com. v. Wingel, 32 D. & C. 75, 81 (Pa. 1938).
139. See Com. v. Collins, 43 Pa. C.C. 390, 391 (1915).
140. Com. ex tel. Reeves v. Skelly, 8 D. & C. 585 (Pa. 1926); 1 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL PROcEDURE § 59 (9th ed. 1918). Cf. Com. ex. rel. Spencer v. Ashe, 364
Pa. 442, 71 A.2d 799 (1950).
141. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 12, 1951, p. 33.
142. 136 Pa. Super. 32, 7 A.2d 33 (1939). In that case there was an attack, not
on an illegal arrest, but on a defect in the procedure followed at the preliminary
hearing.
143. Com. v. Wingel, 32 D. & C. 75 (Pa. 1938).
show that the arrest was authorized by law.1 44  But proof of lawful au-
thority operates as a complete defense,145 and if the officer acted in good
faith, though unlawfully, he is not liable for punitive or exemplary dam-
ages, which will only be awarded where the plaintiff proves malice in fact.' 46
In the past, plaintiffs have been quite successful in recovering substantial
verdicts, 147 but no recent case of this sort was discovered.
Various reasons have been advanced for the reluctance of citizens to
utilize the machinery of the law. For one thing the average citizen is not
willing to take the financial risk and trouble attendant upon litigation.
Days may be lost from work, heavy expenses may be incurred in an unsuc-
cessful suit and the recovery may be quite small. Offended citizens, espe-
cially those who are considered "police property," are often afraid of
antagonizing the police for fear of retribution. Attorneys may discourage
suits of this nature because they are unremunerative and because of a
belief that the judges are prejudiced in favor of police offibers. With
little to gain they see no point in antagonizing the police. When an illegal
arrest has been accompanied by an assault and battery, a different situation
is presented. The victim's desire for redress is less likely to be overcome
by reflection upon the hazards of litigation, and his chances of a substan-
tial recovery against the officer are much increased, thereby making his
case more attractive to an attorney. Even so, only a handful of (un-
reported) recent cases of this nature were discovered.
Criminal Prosecutions Against Officers.-In order to bring the sanc-
tions of the criminal law to bear upon the officer, the illegally arrested
person has almost insurmountable hurdles in his path. He must break
down the natural and strong reluctance of the prosecuting authorities to
commence actions against those who are often called upon to work with
them; '48 and where the prosecution is for the crime of false imprisonment
it must be proved not only that the arrest was illegal, but also that the
officer was acting from malicious motives.'49 Thus, good faith or action
144. McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881) ; McAleer v. Good, 216 Pa. 473,
65 Atl. 934 (1907).
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid. "It is not the business of the officers to handle these people with
gloves; and where they have, in strictness, transcended the authority of the law, they
should be allowed to show that they did not molest them wantonly or inconsiderately."
Russell v. Shuster, 8 W. & S. 308, 310 (Pa. 1844).
147. Lentz v. Raum, 59 Pa. Super. 260 (1915) ($300) ; Rarick v. McManomon,
17 Pa. Super. 154 (1901) ($200 recovered from officer who arrested for an indecent
exposure which he did not see); Flinn v. Graham, 3 Pitt. 195 (Pa. 1870) ($70).
Cf. Burk v. Howley, 179 Pa. 539, 36 Atl. 327 (1897) (new trial granted officer after
verdict against him and co-defendant for $8250); McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa.
63 (1881) (judgment of $2500 reversed). See also McAleer v. Good, 216 Pa.
473, 65 Atl. 934 (1907); Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binney *315 (Pa. 1814); Burford v.
Richards, 58 Pa. Super. 8 (1914).
148. See Justice Murphy dissenting in Volf v. Coloradb, 338 U.S. 25, 42
(1949).
149. Coin. v. Trunk, 311 Pa. 555, 167 Atl. 333 (1933).
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in pursuance of a supposed duty is a complete defense to this charge.'5 0
This heavy burden on the prosecution is probably the principal reason why
there are so few reported cases of this nature against officers.' 51
Prosecutions for assault and battery in connection with arrests may
be of two types. They may be founded on an illegal arrest alone, since that
constitutes an assault and battery,152 and there need be no proof of malice
on the part of the arresting officer. The penalties in such cases are slight, 5
and the prosecutions few; 1 hence there is little deterrent effect on the
officer. Prosecutions for this crime may also grow out of a charge of
rough treatment by an officer in making an arrest. The law allows an
officer to use such force as is reasonably necessary to accomplish an ar-
rest; 155 and a prosecuting witness may have difficulty refuting the claim
that his actions compelled the officer to use that degree of force.156
Federal Remedies.-The availability of the Federal Civil Rights
Acts, 57 or their criminal counterpart, 158 to redress police deprivations of a
person's rights, is still highly theoretical. A civil suit of this type com-
menced against an officer in a federal court'19 must be founded on proof
that there was a deprival of a constitutionally protected right, privilege
or immunity,' 6° and that the deprival was accomplished under and by
virtue of state sanction.' 6 ' In the case of a criminal prosecution, there
150. Ibid. See also Note, Motive as an Essential Element of the Crime of False
Imprisonment, 38 DIcKINSON L. REv. 184 (1934).
151. The only other Pennsylvania case discovered was Com. v. Brewer, 109 Pa.
Super. 429, 167 Atl. 386 (1933), which sustains an indictment for false imprisonment
on the ground that the offense was indictable at common law, citing 4 Br- Comm.
* 218.
152. Com. v. Stirk, 5 Lane. 415 (Pa. 1888); Com. v. Ridgeway, 2 Dist. 59
(Pa. 1892).
153. The officer was fined $1 in Com. v. Ridgeway, 2 Dist. 59 (Pa. 1892).
154. In addition to the case cited in note 152 supra, mention of only one other
prosecution of this nature was discovered: Burford v. Richards, 58 Pa. Super. 8, 9
(1914).
155. Com. v. Crowley, 26 Pa. Super. 124 (1904); Com. v. Max, 8 Phila. 422
(Pa. 1870).
156. This claim is usually reiterated by as many officers as were present when
the arrest occurred. See Note, 43 HAgv. L. Rav. 617, 623 (1930).
157. See especially, 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1947), "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any state . . . subjects . . .
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured . . . at law, . . . equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
158. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1950).
159. Jurisdiction is in the Federal Courts by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1950) regardless of diversity of citizenship or the amount of damages involved.
160. See Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga. 1947); McShane v.
Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949). Cf. McCartney v. West Virginia, 156
F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1946) (a claim against a sheriff for false arrest and imprisonment
was characterized as immaterial, unsubstantial and frivolous, made solely for the pur-
pose of obtaining jurisdiction).
161. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); United States v.
Screws, 140 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) ;
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951); Picking v. Pa. R. Co., 151 F.2d
240 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1945).
would also have to be proof that the deprivation was wilful. No case has
yet reached the Supreme Court for a decision as to whether a mere un-
lawful arrest constitutes the required deprivation of a constitutional right
to come within the scope of these acts. In any event, the use of the federal
processes at least removes the stumbling block of a possibly unwilling
District Attorney's office. The dearth of cases may be due to the diffi-
culties of proof involved.
1 6 2
Internal Police Sanctions.-Machinery exists within the police force
for disciplining an" officer who engages in improper conduct. It is set in
motion by a complaint from a citizen to either the District Attorney's
office or the Commissioner of Police; If the District Attorney feels the
matter does not warrant prosecution, he refers it to the Commissioner. The
practice of the present Commissioner, when a complaint is brought to
his attention, is first to investigate it on his own. He questions the officer,
the complainant, who need not confront the officer, and whoever else has
pertinent information. On the basis of his investigation he decides whether
the matter warrants further action. If it does, the Commissioner refers
to the Police Trial Board, which consists of four high-ranking members
of the police force, all the information which he has gathered. The Board
holds a hearing, on the basis of which it finds the officer either guilty or
not guilty of the misconduct with which he is charged-usually drunken-
ness, neglect of duty, or insubordination. The Commissioner abides by
the finding of the Board, and sets the penalty if the officer has been found
guilty. The Commissioner may discharge, demote, suspend, fine, or assign
extra duty to the officer. From a discharge or demotion an appeal lies to
the Civil Service Commission. While this procedure has not yet been
used in the case of an illegal arrest or search, it well could be. Such in-
ternal police discipline is potentially a very effective deterrent to police
lawlessness.
Remedies for Illegal Searches.-The illegal search of the person is an
arrest and is subject to the remedies for an illegal arrest. For the illegal
search of premises-a most effective police tool, which is not an arrest-
separate remedies are provided. The law permits a man to prevent an
officer from illegally entering his home,' but self-help is of little value
against the superior numbers and force of the police. As a practical mat-
ter, civil suits for trespass are almost as ineffective. The measure of dam-
ages is the extent of the injury to property, which in general is nominal.164
In order to recover punitive damages the plaintiff must first establish actual
162. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Williams v. United
States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
163. Justice Stern concurring in Com. v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 88, 85 A.2d 425,
432 (1951).
164. Justice Murphy dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 43 (1949).
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physical damage' 6 5 and then must show malice in fact, 6" which will
not be possible if the officer is engaged in the "honest pursuit of crime." 167
Finally, punitive damages must bear a reasonable proportion to the actual
damages.
68
The one device which has proved effective in curbing illegal searches
is the judicial exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence. Until 1927
the lower courts and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania often afforded
this relief.'6 9 In that year the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Common-
wealth v. Dabbierio, °70 held that admission of evidence gained by an illegal
search was not a denial of the privilege against self-incrimination. Since
that time Pennsylvania courts have admitted such evidence.' 7' Occasionally
a magistrate in Philadelphia has discharged a prisoner when the only evi-
dence against him was obtained by an illegal search.' 72 The present Dis-
trict Attorney has announced that the policy of his office is not to request
the discharge of the defendant for that reason and, further, to use such
evidence at his trial.
173
PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSIONS 174
Suggestions for minimizing the illegality which pervades the field of
arrest have been sought principally from the police and the bar. Two
schools of thought have adherents among the police. One group of young
and vigorous officers wants to see the law changed to comport with rea-
sonable police practice, i.e., that which the police feel they must do, whether
165. Mitchell v. Randall, 288 Pa. 518, 137 Atl. 171 (1927).
166. McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63, 72 (1881).
167. Justice Murphy dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 43 (1949).
168. Mitchell v. Randall, 288 Pa. 518, 137 Atl. 171 (1927) ; Rider v. York Haven
Water Co., 251 Pa. 18, 95 Atl. 803 (1915).
169. E.g., Com. v. Kekic, 3 D. & C. 273 (Pa. 1923).
170. Com. v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 Atl. 679 (1927).
171. E.g., Com. v. Gross, 125 Pa. Super. 373, 189 Atl. 726 (1937), Com. v. Colpo,
98 Pa. Super.'460 (1930).
Recently it was argued before a Philadelphia Common Pleas judge that an arrest
was illegal because the evidence on which it was based was the result of an illegal
search and entry. The judge retorted, "There was a time when it was necessary to
be over solicitous for the accused, but the time has now come when we must be over
solicitous for the public. Crime has become so great and we have been going so much
out of our way to give criminals every last dot-and-dash of their rights that it has
become an abuse." Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 3.
A former Philadelphia Common Pleas judge was noted for finding defendants not
guilty where an illegal search of a private dwelling had been made. The finding of
not guilty eliminated the possibility of a rearrest.
172. For a recent instance see Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 6, 1951, p. 9.
173. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, March 18, 1952, p. 3, col. 3. The District
Attorney stated that he favors the exclusionary rule, but feels that to institute it
would be to make new law, which is not his function.
174. It should be noted that the practices discussed in this Note are those which
were prevalent prior to the recent change in administration in the City of Phila-
delphia. While no prediction can be made on the amount of improvement that will
be forthcoming from this change, it is encouraging to note that the Commissioner
of Police is making a sincere effort to bring police practice into accord with the
law.
or not it is legal. The provisions of the Uniform Arrest Act embody much
of what they desire. Among other things it legalizes frisking, 75 provides
for a lawful two-hour period of detention which is not an arrest,176 and
declares that guilt justifies a felony arrest, regardless of whether the
officer has reasonable grounds for belief in guilt.177 On the other hand, a
group of thoughtful older officers fears any extension of police power,
because the police always take more power than the law gives them.
While these men do not think that the law in its present state is perfect,
they prefer not to see it changed at this time. Far more important than
changing the law, in their view, are sweeping changes in the people who
administer it. Higher caliber police officers are needed. Their attitudes
should be conditioned by early and intensive training. Their commanding
officers should see that they properly enforce the law. The system of
magistrates needs a complete overhauling, and, in particular, magistrates
should be required to be conversant with the law. The judges should cen-
sure illegal arrests instead of condoning them. When all of this is achieved,
then, say these officers, it will be time enough to think of changing the law
under which the police operate. Above all, both factions of the police
desire certainty in the law so that they may know the limits of permissible
conduct.
The lawyers who expressed an opinion, including lawyers in the office
of the District Attorney, generally are concerned with putting teeth into
the existing law. They advocate the exclusionary rule of evidence, effective
criminal sanctions against the police who search-or arrest in violation of
the law, and a reform of the magisterial system.
There is no doubt that the procedural law under which the police
operate must be set out in unmistakable terms in a comprehensive code.
This code should cover every phase of criminal procedure from the time
the machinery of the criminal law is set in motion against the defendant
to the time of final appeal. Such a code of Pennsylvania criminal procedure
has been written under the auspices of the joint State Legislative Com-
mission, composed of members of the legislature, lawyers, judges, and law
professors.178 Its definition of arrest, previously discussed, 179 and its state-
ment of the rules for arrest without warrant, 8 0 seem sound. In connection
with these rules one change should be made in the law as proposed. For
the purpose of arresting without a warrant all but a selected group of
crimes should be treated as misdemeanors. At present there are 101
felonies in the law of Pennsylvani a. Many of these are not so heinous
that the safety of society demands that an officer be given an extensive right
to arrest for them without a warrant. If "felonies" included for this pur-
175. Section 3, 28 VA. L. Rxv. 344 (1942).
176. Section 2(3), 28 VA. L. Rv. 344 (1942).
177. Section 6(2) (B), 28 VA. L. Rav. 345 (1942).
178. Pa. Sen. Bill No. 988, 1949.
179. Pa. Sen. Bill No. 988, 1949, p. 13. See text at note 31 supra.
180. Pa. Sen. Bill No. 988, 1949, p. 19.
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pose only those offenses generally regarded as atrocious crimes, the burden
on the police of keeping all felonies in mind would be eased and the reason
behind the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors for the purpose
of arrest would be better served.18 ' At the very least, such distinctions
as those between cocaine and opium offenses, 82 between various types
of larceny,18 and various kinds of assault and battery 18 4 should be
eliminated.
The Code pays particular attention to the problem of the illegal search.
It specifies when a search warrant may issue, 8 5 and when a search may
be made without a warrant. 88 It provides for criminal sanctions against
an officer who searches a dwelling or other occupied building without a
warrant, unless the search is incident to a lawful arrest or consented to
by the occupant. The penalty for the first offense is a fine not to exceed
$1000, and for any subsequent offense a fine not to exceed $1000 or im-
prisonment not to exceed one year.'8 7 It would enact the exclusionary rule
of evidence, with one major deficiency. While it provides that evidence
obtained by means of an unlawful search must be returned upon petition
to suppress the use of such evidence, it does not provide in so many words
that information gained by an officer from such a search may not be used.'
88
A better rule would require that everything useful to the prosecution which
is discovered either directly or indirectly through an illegal search be ex-
cluded from evidence in any trial against the accused. This is in line with
the strict federal law, which has had such exemplary effect on federal law
enforcement and in upholding constitutional rights. 8 9
Not only is the exclusionary rule the most effective means of checking
the illegal search,190 but in some anomalous situations it may be the only
possible sanction; e.g., where an unreliable accusation is sent out through
official police channels and an arrest and search take place as a result.191
Another beneficial effect of this rule is that, whenever the defendant claims
that evidence should be excluded because it was obtained from a search
incident to an unlawful arrest, the court must rule on the legality of the
181. See Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. * 316, * 318 (Pa. 1814); Brooks v. Com., 61
Pa. 352, 359 (1869) ; Rarick v. McManomon, 17 Pa. Super. 154, 158 (1901).
182. See note 82 supra.
183. Larceny of growing crops and larceny of coal and iron ore are misde-
meanors. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 §§ 4811, 4812 (Purdon 1945). All other kinds
of larceny are felonies. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4807 et seq. (Purdon 1945).
184. Assault and battery-misdemeanor (§ 4708) ; aggravated assault and battery
-misdemeanor (§ 4709) ; assault with intent to kill-felony (§ 4710) ; attempts with
intent to kill-felony (§ 4711) ; assault with intent to maim-felony (§ 4712) ; pointing
deadly weapons-misdemeanor (§ 4716).
185. Pa. Sen. Bill No. 988, 1949, p. 50.
186. Id. at 54.
187. Ibid.
188. Id. at 52.
189. See Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See note 76
supra.
190. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44 et seq. (Justice Murphy's dissenting
opinion).
191. See text at note 56 et seq. supra.
arrest in order to determine the admissibility of the evidence. The body
of case law which would emerge from such decisions is something which
Pennsylvania has needed for a long time, and would still need even if a
Code were passed. Even the most comprehensive code can only be a
skeletal form upon which the flesh of decision must be grafted. Even-
tually, after enough decisions on what constitutes "reasonable grounds"
and what is "in the presence of the officer," the police will have a much
clearer idea of what they may and may not do than is possible under the
present state of the law. Of course, it will still be highly desirable for
the officer to obtain a warrant in all cases where absolute expediency does
not require an immediate arrest.
While these sanctions would solve the problem of the illegal search,
they do not deal with the problem of the illegal arrest. Two provisions
directed at the latter should be written into the Code. (1)-A criminal
penalty for an illegal arrest comparable to the one for an illegal search.
But possible criminal penalties against police officers, while a deterrent
factor, are not enough. The offended person must be willing to register
a complaint, the District Attorney must be willing to prosecute, and the
jury must be willing to convict, even though the officer has arrested a
guilty man. Hence, (2)-A provision that "No magistrate shall have juris-
diction over any defendant who has been brought before him by virtue
of an illegal arrest. 19 2  If objection is raised to the jurisdiction of the
magistrate on this ground, he shall forthwith hear and determine this
issue. If he shall retain jurisdiction, an interlocutory appeal shall be
allowed to the Court of Quarter Sessions and from there to the appellate
courts. Pending the determination of the appeal, the defendant shall be
allowed to post bail, if the offense charged is bailable, without waiving his
right to challenge the arrest."
The advantages of such a law would be twofold: it would compel
an officer to use the power with which he has been entrusted either law-
fully or uselessly, and it would cause a quick build-up of the body of case
law. The objection which most frequently has been made to this proposal
is that it would prove useless because the magistrate could immediately
issue a warrant for the rearrest of anyone whom he discharges. The answer
to this objection is that if the warrant is not issued on probable cause
or if the complaint upon which it is based is defective,198 this second arrest
too is illegal and can be challenged in the same way. If the warrant is
properly issued, there is no reason why the person should not be re-
arrested, and the officer at least has been taught to respect the law.
For this remedy to fulfill its promise much will depend upon the
quality of the committing magistrates, because they will be called upon
to rule on the legality of arrests and will be asked to issue a great many
192. Com. v. Krubeck, 23 Pa. C.C. 35, 38 (1899) : "As the arrest of the defend-
ant was not lawful, the subsequent proceedings based upon it are void." To the
same effect is Borough of Plymouth v. Williams, 8 Kulp 167 (Luzerne Co., Pa. 1895).
193. See text at note 3 et seq. supra.
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warrants. Their rulings on legality will govern the considerable number
of cases where no appeal will be taken because defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel, 94 because the cost is prohibitive, or because the penalty
to which he will be subject on conviction is so slight that an appeal is
not worth the expense. To assure the best possible dispensation of law
at the magistrate level it was thought necessary by everyone interviewed
(except the magistrates) that the position of magistrate, in Philadelphia at
least, be open only to persons trained in the law, who will divorce them-
selves from active participation in partisan politics during their term.
Further, legislation defining the rights, powers, and duties of the magis-
trate, such as is embodied in the proposed Code,195 should be passed.
Even the exclusionary rule and the jurisdictional rule, the most effec-
tive means of dealing with arrest and search illegality, could be nullified
by an uncooperative police force. If so minded, the police could protect
criminals by deliberately making illegal arrests-and searches so that con-
victions could not be obtained.196 By making a great number of arrests
they could deceive the public, into thinking they were doing an efficient
job and that the law was hamstringing their efforts. But proper disci-
pline would quickly stop such activity. Or the police could simply do noth-
ing in the sincere belief that the law would not only make effective police
work too difficult, but would punish it.'9 7 But it has been demonstrated
that scientifically trained police indoctrinated with respect for law and
the rights of their fellow-citizens, under vigorous and intelligent leadership,
can effectively function under rules far stricter than those here proposed. 98
Even if the recommended laws would in practice reduce the efficiency of
the police, ". . . So do the requirements for arraignment, the prohibition
against coerced confessions, the right to bail, the jury trial, and most of our
other procedural safeguards. 'We in this country, however, early made
the choice-that the dignity and privacy of the individual were worth more
to society than an all-powerful police force." 19
Paula R. Markowitz
Walter I. Suminerfield, Jr.
194. 'Assistant District Attorneys have estimated that 90% of the defendants at
preliminary hearings are not represented by counsel. Many of the defendants no
doubt feel that hiring a lawyer for the preliminary hearing is a waste of money.
One lawyer says that the hearing even now can be utilized to safeguard the rights
of the defendant, if counsel will thoroughly cross-examine the arresting officers and
thus place on the record all facts possibly relevant. Some of these may turn out to
be very important at trial.
195. Pa. Sen. Bill No. 988, 1949, pp. 14, 28 et seq.
196. This problem exists in Chicago. Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of
Criminal Justice, 46 IL. L. REv. 385, 392 (1951).
197. Cf. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on
Criminal Procedure (1931) 19-21, reprinted in MICHAE. and XVVEcHsLER, CRIn. LAW
AND ITs AD INIsTRATION 91 (1940).
198. As to FBI see text at notes 76, 77, 189 snpra. As to police of Great Britain,
see Note, 43 HARv. L. REv. 618 n.6 (1930) ; MICHAEL and WEcHs.ER, op. cit. supra
note 197, at 1225 n.
199. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 46 (1951) (concurring opinion of
Justice Douglas).
LIMITATIONS ON THE LEGISLATURE: PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE III
Although it has been subjected to constant criticism almost since the
day of its inception, the present Pennsylvania Constitution, amendments
excepted, has been the fundamental law of the Commonwealth since 1874.
In 1921, 1923, and 1935, acts were passed by the legislature calling for
conventions to revise the constitution, but in each case the proposal was
rejected by the voters. Since then, agitation for another convention has
continued.'
The spirit which motivated the delegates to the convention of 1873
was one of reform. During the preceding ten years corruption and
favoritism in the legislature had reached new heights.2 The delegates
were resolved to change all this, and the result was a constitution of
extreme length, rigidity, and attention to detail. In this respect it differs
little from other state constitutions of the same era; but when contrasted
with the Federal Constitution which plots out in general outline the
fundamental structure and principles of government, the Pennsylvania
Constitution appears to be little more than a conglomeration of statutory
enactments.
Article III has been chosen for evaluation in this Note because here
the inherent distrust of the legislature, which is the key-note of the instru-
ment as a whole, reached its culmination in express procedural and sub-
stantive limitations on the legislature's power. Its provisions are diverse
and uneven in their range. Thus there is included a section on change
of venue 3 which belongs properly under the article on the judiciary, a
provision dealing with satisfaction of state-owned obligations 4 which be-
longs in the article on finance, and a section devoted to the means by
which the state capital may be changed. 5 Each instance of past and an-
ticipated legislative misdoing is pinpointed in a provision designed to
remedy the particular evil. Several of the sections, taken together, are
really fragmentary codes dealing with various facets of official behavior
and state procurement policies.0 It is this oversolicitous preoccupation
1. The Pennsylvania Bar Association's Committee on the Constitution currently
advocates such a convention.
2. Edmonds, The Development of Constitutional Limitations upon the Power of
the Legislature in Pennsylvania, 21 ANNUAL REPORT OF PA. BAR Assoc. 252, 266-267
(1915).
3. PA. CoNsT., Art. III, § 23. Hereinafter, relevant sections of the Pennsylvania
Constitution will be cited merely by the Article and section numbers.
4. Art. III, § 24.
5. Art. III, § 28. "No law changing the location of the capital of the State shall
be valid until the same shall have been submitted to the qualified electors of the Com-
monwealth at a general election and ratified and approved by them." This provision
was placed in the constitution to "prevent the perpetual agitation of the question of the
removal of the State Capital." 7 CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 230 (1873). Today the
tradition of the location of the capital at Harrisburg is so well established that the
provision serves no purpose.
6. Thus in Article III, §§ 10 and 13 are devoted to the duties, terms of office, and
compensation of state officers. Sections 29, 30, 31, and 32 define official bribery and
provide for its investigation and punishment. Section 33 provides that a member of
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with the scandals and problems of the past which produced in Article III
provisions which have embarrassed later generations and provided much
of the litigation under the Constitution of 1873. The purpose of this
Note is to point up some of the legal problems which have arisen and to
suggest which of the limitations, both procedural and substantive, should
be revised, retained, or discarded.
PROCEDURE AND FORMX
Perhaps the most striking manifestation of distrust of legislatures is
in the detailed procedural and formal constitutional specifications. The
general basis of such provisions is to insure procedures consistent with
intelligent law-making processes and deliberation. Consideration of the
soundness of constitutional formal and procedural directions requires a
revaluation of the reasons for, and functions of, the provisions adopted
in 1873.
Procedure.-The second clause of section 1, providing that "... no
bill shall be so altered or amended, on its passage through either house,
as to change its original purpose," was aimed at the practice of attaching
"rider" amendments of a character substantially different from the bill
deliberated upon.7 Amendments are thereby sought to be limited to fur-
therance of the purpose of the bill as introduced.
It is also required that all bills be referred to a committee for special-
ized deliberation before consideration by the Assembly, and that upon
return from committee all bills shall be printed and made available for the
use of the members.8 After the bill is reported out by the committee, and
printed, subsequent amendments made during legislative debates must
also be printed for the members before the final vote is taken on the bill.9
The requirement of Section 4 that "Every bill shall be read at length,
on three different days, in each house . . ." apparently stems from the
time when illiteracy was not foreign to legislative membership, and when
printing was slower and less reliable than it is today.10
the legislature interested in a pending bill must disclose the fact and not vote thereon.
Section 11 provides for payment for services to the state. Section 12 is a fan-
tastically detailed provision governing contract letting for state printing and "the
repairing and furnishing the halls and rooms" used by the legislature.
These sections might serve as the basis of future codes but they should not be in
the constitution.
7. See WHITE, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 211
(1907).
8. Art. III, § 2: "No bill shall be considered unless referred to a committee, re-
turned therefrom and printed for the use of the members." (no issue under this sec-
tion has appeared in the reported cases).
9. Art. III, § 4: ". . . all amendments made thereto shall be printed for the use
of the members, before the final vote is taken on the bill . . ." (emphasis added).
This clause precludes harassing delay occasioned by the prior requirement of printing
individual amendments before voting on them. See S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATEs 246-7
(1873).
10. Horack, Constitutional Limitations on Legislative Procedure in W. Va.
39 W.Va. L.Q. 294, 317 (1933). Cf. COOLEY, CONST. LIMITATIONS 117 (1903).
The foregoing procedural provisions have been reduced, by judicial
construction, to inert words. It has been held that constitutional direc-
tions regarding procedure only, as distinguished from restrictions on the
legislature's powers or specifications as to form, are mandatory only upon
the conscience of the legislators. The court will not look behind a bill
duly certified by the presiding officers and signed by the Governor.11
Consequently, these constitutional provisions amount to less than law.'
2
These procedural rules are restated in the rules of each house of the
General Assembly.' 3 However, as a result of the constitutional restraint
having been lifted by the courts, they are treated by the legislators as being
waivable like all internal procedural rules,14 at least in the absence of a
member's insistence upon the constitutional procedure.' 5 When the safe-
guards against hasty, desultory procedure are most needed, wheti the
quantity of legislative business is most pressing,' 6 such rules are customarily
waived. This practice is conspicuous in the case of dispensing with three
readings "at length."
A constitution, by its very nature, should contain only mandatory
provisions. If any of these procedural provisions have outlived their
usefulness, they should be removed from the constitution by amendment
and not merely rendered ineffective by the courts or the legislature. On
the other hand, if these requirements are desirable, they should be so
drawn that legislative action which deviates therefroni is deemed in excess
of authority and therefore void. This would not necessarily open a
"floodgate of litigation" on every bill.1 For example, the search for
compliance with the procedural requirements could be limited to disclosures
in the Legislative Journal.'8
It is submitted that the three reading requirement of section 4 should
be omitted from the constitution. When exercised, it is an unduly de-
tailed and time-consuming procedural gesture without a justifiable pur-
pose. The historical basis for this section is no longer applicable.19  Its
11. Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401 (1877) ("the subject is not within the pale of
judicial inquiry") ; Mikell v. School Dist. of Phila., 359 Pa. 113, 58 A2d 339 (1948)
(the court refused to look at the origin of a revenue bill despite the requirement of
§ 14 that all revenue raising bills shall originate in the House).
12. See COOLEY, op. cit, supra note 10, at 186, 187, 214.
13. Pa. Senate Rules 17 (3 readings), 18 and 37 (no alteration in purpose), 31
and 37 (committee reference) ; Pa. House Rules 17, 35 (reference to committee), 42,
43, 44 and 45 (3 readings), 46 (no alteration in purpose). All Rules are those of the
1951 session.
14. See Pa. Senate Rule 29; Pa. House Rule 88. Waiving constitutional pro-
cedural requirements is poor parliamentary practice; see ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER
REVISED 48 (1915).
15. See Mikell v. School Dist. of Phila., 359 Pa. 113, 123, 58 A.2d 339, 344 (1948).
16. In re legislative "log jams" see McGeary, Changes in Legislative Sessions, 25
TEmp. L.Q. - (1952).
17. "If every law could be contested in the courts on the ground of informality
in its enactment, the floodgate of litigation would be opened so widely, society would be
deluged in the flow." Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401, 412 (1877).
18. See Metzenbaum, Judicial Interpretation of Constitutional Limitations on
Legislative Procedure in Ohio, 11 OHro ST. L.J. 456 (1950). Art. II, § 12, requires
the Pa. Assembly to keep a legislative journal.
19. See text at note 10 supra.
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only practical function has been to assure that all bills lay over at least
three days between introduction and the final vote. But this could be
accomplished directly by establishing a time limit within which bills may
not be called to a final vote.
Although detailed deliberation by committee cannot be enforced, the
requirement that all bills be referred to committee before consideration by
the house is a desirable procedural requirement which reduces, to some
extent, the opportunity for passage of ill-considered measures. This
requirement should be retained.
20
The second clause of section 1, directing that no bill shall be so
altered during its consideration as to change its original purpose, requires
re-introduction of the altered bill, with a properly amended title, as a new
bill. If followed, this would serve two important functions. First, it
would assure listing and publication of the corrected title with "bills
introduced," the importance of which is discussed hereafter; second, it
would preclude evasion of the committee reference mandate by substantial
amendment of a bill after it has been reported out by the committee.
Therefore, it should remain in the constitution.
Form.-As distinguished from the procedural specifications in Article
Il, the provisions prescribing forms to which bills must comply have
been given effect by "the court. All the requirements as to procedure and
form aimed at safeguarding against improvident and corrupt legislation
are directed to "bills." To make these requirements effective, section 1
provides that "no law shall be passed except by bill. . . ." Procedure
and form regarding the relatively informal legislative resolution is left to
the rules of each house, and any legislative matter incorporated in a mere
resolution is ineffective.
21
Section 3 provides that "no bill, except general appropriation bills
[which are explained by section 15 to be those providing for the "ordinary
expenses of the executive, legislative and judicial departments,
interest on the public debt and for public schools"] 22 shall be passed con-
taining more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its
title." 23 The purpose of this section, as supplemented by section 15, was
to put an end to "log-rolling" and "omnibus bills," whereby unpopular
measures were passed upon the strength of popular legislation to which
they were attached.24 Both the members of the legislature and the public
20. For a suggested improvement of the committee system see Braham, Reform
of Pennsylvania's Legislative Procedure, 25 TEmP. L.Q. - (1952).
21. Scudder v. Smith, 331 Pa. 165, 200 Atl. 601 (1938).
22. Art. III, § 15.
23. "This provision of the Constitution of 1874 was adopted without debate. It is
derived from the Second Amendment of 1864. . . ." Com. v. Stofchek, 322 Pa. 513,
517, 185 Atl. 840, 843 (1936). The first case to construe this section was Blood v.
Mercelliott, 53 Pa. 391 (1866), limited by In re Rhoad in Borough of Phoenixville,
109 Pa. 44 (1885).
24. See' Hadley's Case, 336 Pa. 100, 107, 6 A.2d 874, 878 (1939). The same
purpose is given for § 15; see Com. v. Gregg, 161 Pa. 582, 586 (1894).
were the victims. 2"  This section has been urged upon the court, in
attacks upon legislation, more frequently than any other in Article III.
Thus a substantial body of case law has evolved, which reasonably
effectuates the purposes of the section.26  No longer must the legislators
and the governor accept the bad to secure the good. The title limits the
scope of the act,27 and must give reasonable notice, at least sufficient to
put the reader on inquiry, of all its substantive provisions. 28 Matters
which are not germane to disclosures in the title are invalid.29
Related in purpose is section 6, which aims at so-called "blind amend-
ments." 30 By that section "no law shall be revived, amended, or the
provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but
so much, thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be
re-enacted and published at length." This requirement is designed to
insure intelligent consideration of proposed amendments in light of the
objects to be accomplished. 31 By judicial interpretation, this section only
applies to express amendments and revivals, does not apply to supple-
mentary acts,32 and requires the amended sections to be published at
length in their new form only.3 To require otherwise would have im-
posed an unanticipated burden on the legislature. It may be that without
setting forth the amended section in its original form, this device fails to
emphasize the precise nature of the change accomplished. 34  But, what
is of real importance is that this provision as interpreted insures, to some
extent, consideration of the substantive end result on its merits. Blind
amendments, which merely cited the words to be changed and those to be
substituted, were insufficient to accomplish either. Disclosure of the
25. "The objects . . . of this section . . . were to prevent 'log-rolling' and
fraud, trickery, or surprise in legislation. Every measure is to stand on its own merits
without borrowing strength from another, and the members of each House, and still
more the public, are to have notice by its very title of the contents or nature of a
bill." BUcKALEW, CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 68 (1883). See COOLEY, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 205.
26. See, e.g., Com. v. Stofchek, 322 Pa. 513, 517, 185 Atl. 840, 843 (1936) : "The
provision was not intended to exercise a pedantic tyranny over the grammatical efforts
of legislators, nor to place them between the horns of a constructional dilemma,
namely, that the title of an act must be so general or so particularized as to include
all of its subject matter, and yet not so general as to give no indication of its purpose,
nor so particular as to inferentially exclude from its scope any items inadvertently
omitted."
27. Com. v. DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 66 A.2d 649 (1949).
28. Com. v. Stofchek, 322 Pa. 513, 185 Atl. 840 (1936) ; In re Rhoad in Borough
of Phoenixville, 109 Pa. 44 (1885); Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Pa. 433 (1876).
29. Sewickley Borough v. Sholes, 118 Pa. 165 (1888). See generally Note,
Const. Requirements as to Title of a Bill, 25 TEMrP. L.Q. 63 (1951) ; WHITE, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 214-229.
30. See Wilkes Barre v. Pa. P.U.C., 164 Pa. Super. 210, 215-16 (1949).
31. See Horack, supra note 10, at 305; REINSCE, AmERIcA LEGISLATURES AND
LEGISLATIVE METHODS 138 (1907).
32. Wilkes Barre v. -Pa. P.U.C., 164 Pa. Super. 210 (1949) ; Gallagher v. McLean,
139 Pa. 583 (1899); see Hadley's Case, 336 Pa. 100, 107, 6 A.2d 874, 878 (1939).
See generally Note, Referential Legislation in Pa., 25 TEmP. L.Q. 59 (1951) ; WHITE,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 229-232; COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 215, 216.
33. See Wilson v. Downing, 4 Pa. Super. 487, 493 (1897).
34. See 1-orack, supra note 10, at 306.
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changed portions can be emphasized by less than requiring republication
of the old form at length. For example, the changed words may be shown
in brackets, and the new may be underscored, as is required by Rule 20
of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives.
Sections 3 and 6 together assure, to some extent, a means of dis-
covery of all pending matters by legislators and the public, thereby afford-
ing opportunity to all who might have an interest therein to make their
views known before the measure becomes law. Although the full text of
all bills is made available to the legislators,3 5 titles alone are examined
initially. On the basis of this inspection the member determines whether
to make further investigation of the contents and merits. To the extent
that these sections are for the protection of legislators, there is implicit
recognition that titles alone are frequently relied upon. Many votes have
been based upon a mere reading of the title and acceptance of some para-
phrased declaration of its contents, made by other members of the house
in question.36 As for the public, it would be unfair to accept anything less
than fair notice in the title of a bill. Bar associations, newspapers, and
legal periodicals examine the titles of all bills introduced. In Philadel-
phia, the Legal Intelligencer publishes daily lists of titles of all bills intro-
duced the preceding day. Failure to comply with these two sections
facilitates ill-considered voting by the legislators, and deprives the public
of the opportunity to make its views known to its representatives before
the measure becomes law. Therefore it is not unreasonable to require
adherence to the prescribed forms, with invalidity the penalty for deviation.
Another requirement of form is that of section 9, that all bills shall
be signed by the presiding officer of each house.37 Before this provision
found its way into the constitution, such signatures were not necessary to
the validity of a law.38  Occasionally a bill was signed by the governor,
by fraud or accident, which had never been duly passed by the legislature.3 9
The signatures of the presiding officers serve as a certification that the
bill referred to the governor has been duly passed by the Assembly. By
requiring three responsible signatures, the possibility of accident is re-
moved and fraud is rendered more difficult. Nothing appears to suggest
35. See Pa. House Rule 19.
36. "Even a casual investigation into the methods adopted by modern legislation
[legislatures?] will show that the passage of any bill upon its intrinsic merits is
of rare occurrence ... " Catron v. County Ct., 18 Colo. 553, 558, 33 Pac. 513, 514
(1893).
37. Art. III, § 9: "The presiding officer of each House shall, in the presence of
the House over which he presides, sign all bills and joint resolutions passed by the
General Assembly, after their titles have been publicly read immediately before sign-
ing, and the fact of signing shall be entered on the journal." The procedural require-
ment of this section that the titles be read immediately before signing was to give
meaning to the authentication. Previously it had been common practice for the
presiding officer to sit before the house signing a stack of papers consecutively, which
defeated the public character of the act. Such signing might as well have been done
in private chambers. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 630.
38. Speer v. Plank Road Co., 22 Pa. 376 (1853).
39. See 2 CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 630 (1873).




Special Legislation.-Section seven provides that "The General As-
sembly shall not pass any local or special law," then in twenty-six para-
graphs sets forth the instances in which special legislation is prohibited.41
This section was designed to prevent pressure groups from obtaining, by
log-rolling and vote trading, special legislation producing inequalities be-
tween similar persons, places or things. 42  Another evil of special legis-
lation is that it consumes much time which could be spent considering
general legislation. The significance of this factor is indicated to some
extent by the fact that at the last session of the legislature under the prior
constitution, 1070 of the 1113 bills passed were special laws. 43  The
possibility of such a volume of special legislation is confined to another
era of history. For example, in 1941, over one thousand private acts were
passed by the Tennessee Legislature,4 4 although the Tennessee Constitu-
tion contains a limited prohibition of special legislation. 5
All the cases defining special legislation are refinements of the prin-
ciples established by two early cases. In Wheeler v. Philadelphia,46 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
40. For a good discussion of case law under both the formal and procedural provi-
sions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see WHITE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 211-232.
41. For example, "Authorizing the creation, extension or impairment of liens:
Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs or school
districts :
Changing the names of persons or places:
Changing the venue in civil or criminal cases:
Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering or maintaining, roads, highways,
streets or alleys:
Relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies except
for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between this and
any other State.
Vacating roads, town plots, streets or alleys:
Relating to cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not of the State:
Granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive
privilege or immunity, or to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay
down a railroad track."
42. See Ayar's Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, .277, 16 AtI. 356, 360 (1889); REincH,
AMERICAN LEGISLATURES AND LEGISLATIVE METHODS 147-148 (1907).
43. Edmonds, The Development of Constitutional Limitations Upon the Power of
the Legislature in Pennsylvania 21 ANNUAL REPORT OF PA. BAR Assoc. 252, 267
(1915).
44. Roody, Special Legislative Acts and Municipalities Under the Tennessee
Constitution, 21 TENN. L. REv. 621 n. 1 (1950).
45. TENN. CoNsT., Art. XI, § 8: "The Legislature shall have no power to suspend
any general law for the benefit of any particular individual, nor to pass any law for
the benefit of individuals, inconsistent with the general laws of the land; nor to pass
any law granting to any individual or individuals, rights, privileges, immunities, or
exemptions, other than such as may be, by the same law, extended to any member
of the community who may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such
law ..
46. 77 Pa. 338 (1875).
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". .. [A] statute which relates to persons or things as a class,
is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or
things of a class is special. . .. The word [class) is used not to
designate numbers, but a rank or order of persons or things; in
society it is used to indicate equality, or persons distinguished by
common characteristics, as the trading classes; the laboring classes;
in science, it is a division or arrangement, containing the subordinate
divisions of order, genus, and species."
47
Thirteen years later the court added:
"Classification, with the view of legislating for either class sepa-
rately, is essentially unconstitutional unless a necessity therefore ex-
ists,-a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities, clearly dis-
tinguishing those of one class frorp each of the other classes, and
imperatively demanding legislation for each class, separately, that
would be useless and detrimental to the others." 48
The constitutionality of a classification is determined by its relation-
ship to the end which the statute is intended to attain; therefore, a par-
ticular classification may be proper for some purposes but unconstitutional
for others. An example of this is the act which provided for the appoint-
ment of a civil service commission for the police force of any borough,
town, or first class township having three or more paid police officers.49
In holding this statute constitutional, the court stated that it would be
"absurd to set up a comprehensive civil service . . . in any political sub-
division having one or two, or perhaps no police officers." 50 But it
would be just as absurd to classify municipalities on this basis for almost
any other purpose. A more subtle classification was held constitutional in
Iben v. Monaca Borough,51 where the statute required municipalities to
pay a policeman or fireman his salary and medical expenses, if injured in
performance of his duties. 52 The court reasoned that the hazards endured
by the police and firemen justified the legislature in restricting the benefits
of this statute to them.
An example of unconstitutional classification is the statute which
imposed restrictions upon foreclosure sales of mortgaged property.5 3  The
47. Id. at 348-350. The court then held that it was reasonable to classify cities
according to population and that the Act of May 23, 1874, P.L. 230, § 1, providing
for three classes of cities, was constitutional because the needs of a city of one million
could not be satisfied by legislation designed for cities with a population of ten
thousand, nor should a small city be inflicted with legislation necessary to govern a
large city.
48. Ayars Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, 281, 16 Atl. 356, 363 (1889). The court held
unconstitutional the classification act of May 24, 1887, P.L. 204, because no necessity
appeared for the division of cities into seven classes.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 351 (Purdon Supp. 1950).
50. Haverford Twp. v. Siegle, 346 Pa. 1, 3, 28 A.2d 786, 787 (1942).
51. 158 Pa. Super. 46, 43 A.2d 425 (1945).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 327 (Purdon Supp. 1950).
53. Act of July 2, 1937, P.L. 2751.
court found that the consequences of a sale of the debtor's land for less
than its "market value" (the evil sought to be prevented by the statute)
were the same whether the sale occurred as a result of a mortgage fore-
closure or execution of a judgment; therefore, the legislature could not
constitutionally restrict the former and not the latterY4 The reasoning
utilized in Dufour v. Maize 5 5 to sustain the validity of the Bituminous
Open Pit Mining Conservation Act 56 is somewhat inconsistent with the
result of the mortgage case. The Mining Act was passed to conserve
wild life and improve land,57 but it regulated only the strip mining of
bituminous coal and there was no evidence that this was a greater threat
to conservation than strip mining of any other mineral. However, the
court presumed that the classification was valid 58 and added: "It may be
true, that other evils exist in the strip mining of other products which
should be corrected by the legislature. However, a start has been made,
and there is authority for the proposition that when an evil is conspicuously
in need of correction, action may be taken, although other evils exist which
are not corrected." 59
The problems caused, or perhaps solved, by the courts presuming
either that the act of the legislature is constitutional or that the classifica-
tion chosen is unconstitutional is illustrated by the "veterans preference"
cases. In the first of these, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
veteran must obtain the minimum qualifying civil service test score (70%)
before the 15% credit could be added to his score; 60 i.e., the classification
of veterans and non-veterans was constitutional only when made among
those who had passed the test. It is far from clear why a classification
which prefers a veteran whose score was 69% (before the 15% credit)
over a non-veteran whose score was 70%o is unconstitutional, while a
classification which prefers a veteran whose score was 70% (before the
15% credit) over a non-veteran whose score was 84% is constitutional.
54. Pennsylvania Co. v. Scott, 329 Pa. 534, 198 AtI. 115 (1938). There was no
hint by the court that the result sought by the statute was not desirable or that there
was no need for legislation in this area; the holding was based solely upon the
different treatment of like situations.
55. 358 Pa. 309, 56 A.2d 675 (1948).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396 (Purdon Supp. 1950).
57. Section 1 set forth the purpose of the act: "This act shall be deemed to be an
exercise of the police power . . . by providing for the conservation and improve-
ment of areas of land affected in the mining of bituminous coal by the open pit or
stripping method, to aid thereby in the protection of birds and wild life, to enhance
the value of such lands for taxation, to decrease soil erosion, to aid in the prevention
of pollution of rivers and streams, to prevent combustion of unmined coal, and gen-
erally to improve the use and enjoyment of said lands."
58. This presumption is evident from the court's language. "The mining of
other materials by the stripping method does not produce all of these results. It
does produce a spoil pile, but no evidence has been produced of any case where there
was water in a cut, where the operation adjoined a deep mine, or where a vein of
coal was left exposed at the bottom of the cut." 358 Pa. 309, 314, 56 A.2d 675, 678
(1948). The dissent refused to indulge in these presumptions and said that classifica-
tion is unconstitutional unless the necessity for it is proven; therefore, for the purpose
of this statute open pit mining is the proper classification.
59. Id. at 314, 56 A.2d at 678.
60. Com. ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d 701 (1938).
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Next the court held unconstitutional a statute exempting veterans from
the age limitation on applicants for certain civil service jobs.61 Since the
court set forth no evidence from which it reached a conclusion that the
value of military experience did not offset the detriment of advanced age,
it must be assumed that the court presumed the classification to be un-
constitutional in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. In the most
recent veterans preference case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the 10% credit was unconstitutional when applied to promotions as
distinguished from appointments. The court based its holding on a pre-
sumption that a 10%o credit was "far too high a value on the benefit to
public service of the military training of veterans." 62 The dissent argued
that the classification of veterans and non-veterans should be presumed
constitutional for the purpose of promotions unless it is proven that the
non-veteran "catches up" with the veteran.
The shifting presumption found in these cases may be the result of a
suspicion that the veterans preference statutes were motivated not by a
desire to obtain better public servants, but rather as a gratuity to veterans.
That the court may sometimes place the presumption where the purpose
of section seven will be served best is evident from Hertz Drivurself v.
Siggins, 3 where the court held that the business of renting motor vehicles
was not sufficiently affected with a public interest to require the issuance
of a certificate of public convenience. 4 The court noted that it was un-
usual for an enterprise to introduce an act into the legislature designed
to regulate its own industry and then petition for leave to appear as
amicus curiae in support of the act when its constitutionality is attacked.6 5
Although section seven tends to produce uniform laws throughout the
state, this is not its primary purpose; and a law will not be unconstitu-
tional merely because it tends to produce diversity. Thus an act which
permitted local municipalities to tax any subject not taxed by the state
government6 did not violate this section even though it resulted in
municipalities taxing different subjects, or the same subject at different
rates.67 Nor does diversity resulting from provision for local option to
accept or reject a regulation cause a statute to be unconstitutional.68
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12198-4407 et seq. (Purdon 1938) ; Carney v. Lowe,
336 Pa. 289, 9 A.2d 418 (1939).
62. Corn. ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 368 Pa. 369, 373, 83 A.2d 382, 383 (1951),
100 U. OF PA. L. REV. 578 (1952).
63. 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948).
64. Act of June 5, 1943 P.L. 901.
65. There were a number of theories upon which the act could have been held
constitutional. The operation of business sought to be regulated depended solely upon
the privilege of using the state highways; great dangers would result if the leased
trucks were operated by incompetent drivers, or by drivers unaware of the fact that
the lessor had permitted the equipment to deteriorate to a dangerous condition; this
business could seriously affect common carriers already regulated.
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 2015.1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1951).
67. English v. Robinson Twp. School Dist., 358 Pa. 45, 55 A.2d 803 (1947).
68. Young v. Fetteroff, 320 Pa. 289, 182 Atl. 676 (1936).
Section 34 was added to Article III in 1923 to end the controversy
over proper classification of municipalities.60 While permitting classifica-
tion according to population, the section limits the number of classes and
"deems" laws relating to each class to be general. 70  Haverford Twp. v.
Siegle 71 permits a statute to cut across these classes when the need of
legislation exists in a number of municipalities of different classes.7 2 The
court has stated that the power to classify under section 34 must be exer-
cised reasonably.73
In Empire Box Corp. v. Chestnut,74 the court held that a statute
which permitted the operation within Pennsylvania of all vessels which
were in the state on a given date, but barred all foreign made vessels which
were not within the state on that date, violated the equal protection clause
of the Federal Constitution. This is one of a number of cases which
indicate that legislation prohibited under section seven may also violate
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.7 5 But it
cannot be shown that in every case the result would be the same whether
decided under section seven or the Fourteenth Amendment. Since special
legislation is clearly undesirable, the great body of law which has evolved
from this concept should not be discarded. The prohibition against
special legislation should remain in the constitution, but sections 7 and 34
should be amended and consolidated to read:
"The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law
either directly, or indirectly by partial repeal of a general law, but
69. The confusion engendered by classification of municipalities prior to the in-
sertion of § 34 is traced in Commonwealth v. Wert, 282 Pa. 575, 580, 583, 128 Atl.
484, 486, 487 (1925).
70. Art. I1, § 34: "The Legislature shall have power to classify counties, cities,
boroughs, school districts, and townships, according to population, and all laws passed
relating to each class, and all laws passed relating to, and regulating procedure and
proceedings in court with reference to any class, shall be deemed general legislation
within the meaning of this Constitution; but counties shall not be divided into more
than eight classes, cities into not more than seven classes, school districts into not
more than five classes, and boroughs into not more than three classes."
71. 346 Pa. 1, 28 A.2d 786 (1942).
72. The cases of Merger of Lower Turkeyfoot Twp. School District, 33 D. & C.
222 (Somerset Co., Pa. 1938) and Merger of Reed Township School Dist., 34 D. & C.
389 (Dauphin Co., Pa. 1939) declared unconstitutional an act providing for the merger
of school districts which did not employ any teachers in 1937. Under the doctrine
of Haverford Twp. v. Siegle, this act, with minor changes, would be held constitu-
tional.
73. Com. ex rel. Kelly v. Cantrell, 327 Pa. 369, 380, 193 Atl. 655, 661 (1937).
An example of unreasonable exercise of the power to classify municipalities accord-
ing to population is seen in Private Acts of Tennessee, 1949, Vol. I, p. 57: "An Act
to authorize and empower the quarterly County Courts of all counties of the State
having a population of not less than Thirteen Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy
(13,870), nor more than Thirteen Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy-five (13,875),
according to the Federal Census of 1930, or any subsequent Federal Census. 3
74. 54 D. & C. 162 (Dauphin Co.), aff'd per curite, 352 Pa. 418, 43 A.2d 88
(1945).
75. E.g., Hertz Drivurself v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1947), where the
court held that the statute (discussed in text at note 64 supra) violated both PA.
C NsT. Art. III, § 7 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Cf. Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 7 A.2d 466 (1939), which held that prohibiting
the carrying of an automobile over the head of the operator of the carrier did not
violate the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.
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laws repealing local or special acts may be passed, and the General
Assembly shall have power to classify counties, cities, boroughs,
school districts, and townships, according to population, and all laws
passed relating to each class shall be deemed general legislation, but
counties shall not be divided into more than .......... classes,
cities into not more than .......... classes, school districts into not
more than ......... classes, boroughs into not more than .........
classes, and townships into not more than .......... classes." 76
This proposed revision eliminates the twenty-six paragraphs in the
present constitution which set forth the instances in which special legis-
lation is prohibited. The reason why the constitutional convention under-
took to limit the prohibition to specific enumerated instances does not
appear in the convention debates. Enumeration is the usual method of
dealing with special legislation," but if the definition of special legislation
in Pennsylvania today is "classification which does not bear a necessary
or reasonable relationship to the end sought," there is no reason why this
test should not be applied to all legislation. Perhaps the present enumera-
tions cover every conceivable case, 78 and the change would be a matter of
style only.
The draft proposed would also eliminate the last paragraph of section
seven, which provides:
"Nor shall any law be passed granting powers or privileges in
any case where the granting of such powers and privileges shall have
been provided for by general law, nor where the courts have juris-
diction to grant the same or give the relief asked for."
This provision would be surplus if all special legislation were prohibited;
it is probably surplus as the constitution is now written.79 City of York
School District's Appeal 80 is the only case which has held a statute un-
constitutional under this paragraph. The statute allowed the taking of
certain public burial grounds for municipal purposes,81 but the court held
76. Section 34 is incorporated as it is now written, except that no specific refer-
ence is made to courts functioning within each class, and a limit is placed upon the
number of classes into which townships may be divided. See note 70 supra. No
opinion is expressed as to the proper number of classes of each type of municipality.
77. Of the forty-two states which prohibit special legislation, thirty-six states
enumerate specific instances in which it is prohibited.
78. In Nolan v. James, 263 Pa. 124, 130, 106 AtI. 235, 237 (1919) the court
stated that there is nothing in the constitution prohibiting special food laws; however,
they also said that the classification fixed by the statute was reasonable, and it may be
safe to guess that if the court had considered the classification to be unreasonable the
statute would have been held unconstitutional as special legislation "regulating labor,
trade, mining or manufacture." Art. III, § 7, f 25.
79. This provision was copied into the present constitution from Art. XI, § 9 of
the Constitution of 1838. It had been added to that instrument by amendment in
1864 and served a function at that time because then there was no other limitation
on special legislation except Art. I, § 14, prohibiting special divorces in any case in
which the courts could grant a divorce.
80. 8 York 145, aff'd per curiam, 169 Pa. 70, 32 Atl. 92 (1895).
81. Act of June 6, 1893, P.L. 342.
that general laws already had provided a method of acquiring land for
such purposes. This statute was also unconstitutional under the ninth
paragraph of section seven which prohibits special legislation "relating to
cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not of the State."
A number of constitutions prohibit special legislation generally by
providing that no special law may be enacted in any case to which a
general law can be made applicable.82  At one stage of the convention of
1873 this provision was in section seven of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
but it was deleted because the delegates were uncertain as to whether the
question of the applicability of a general statute would ultimately be deter-
mined by the legislature or the courts.83 Such a provision might produce
the same result as the revision proposed herein; but the suggested revision
would utilize words defined in many Pennsylvania cases, whereas a pro-
vision that "no special law may be enacted in any case to which a general
law can be made applicable" would introduce a new concept into Penn-
sylvania law.
If the suggested revision of section seven were adopted, section eight
which requires notice of the enactment of special or local legislation 8 4
would be eliminated because nothing denominated special or local legis-
lation would ever be enacted. Even today section eight is almost useless
because special legislation is invalid in most cases under section seven,
and when the requirements of section seven have been met, the statute is
not special and no notice is required even though the act may apply to a
single municipality.8 5
Special Municipal Commissions.-Section 20 80 was placed in the
constitution as a result of the scandal resulting from the corruption and
82. E.g., KAN. CONST. Art. II, § 7, MIcH. CONST. Art. V, § 30, MODEL STATE
CONST. Art. III, §310 (1948). Many states which enumerate specific instances in
which special legislation is prohibited also have a general prohibition against special
legislation in any case to which a general law could be applied. E.g., ARK. CONST.
Art. V, § 25; IND. CONST. Art. IV, § 23; MINN. CONST. Art. IV, § 33; N. DAKOTA
CoNsT. Art. II, § 70; TEx. CONST. Art. III, § 56; W. VA. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 39.
83. No delegate suggested that the uncertainty be resolved by stating within the
constitution whether the court or the legislature would determine the applicability
of a general law. It appears from the debates that each c6ontingency would have been
opposed, either by those desiring to keep useless provisions out of the constitution or
by those who believed that the legislature was already sufficiently restricted by the
enumerated provisions. 5 CONSTITUTIONAL DFATES 187 (1873).
84. Art. III,§ 8. "No local or special bill shall be passed unless notice of the
intention to apply therefor shall have been published in the locality where the matter
or thing to be affected may be situated, which notice shall be at least thirty days
prior to the introduction into the General Assembly of such bill and in the manner
to be provided by law; the evidence of such notice having been published shall be
exhibited in the General Assembly, before such act shall be passed."
85. E.g., Philadelphia is the only city of the first class.
86. "The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private
corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any
municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise,
or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever."
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inefficiency of the commission created by the state government to erect
municipal buildings in Philadelphia and given the power to levy taxes to
pay for the expenditures.8 7 The most obnoxious feature of this building
commission was that it was completely independent of the citizens and
government of Philadelphia.8 During the convention debates only one
delegate recognized that section 20, as written, might restrict local gov-
ernment's power to create commissions to the same extent that it limited
the state government.80 As this delegate foresaw, the court held in
Lighton v. Township of Abington that "the township, as the governmental
agent of the state, is subject to the same prohibition to which the state is
subject." 10 This agency theory has presented difficulties when the court
desired to uphold the constitutionality of a commission created by a local
government. For example, in Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority the
court held that the Authority had the power of eminent domain, but went
on to say that the Authority was simply an administrative body without
power to "perform any municipal function." 91 The courts have ignored
a substantial part of section 20 when passing upon the constitutionality
of a commission created by a local municipality. If the section is inter-
preted in the same way when the constitutionality of a state-created com-
mission is tested, the purpose and intent of the provision will be violated.
Furthermore, this seems to be an instance where the power granted to
the state government should be more limited than that given to the local
units. In any event, the extent to which local municipalities and the state
should be permitted to create special commissions is a basic political ques-
tion which should be resolved, and section 20 should be redrafted to set
forth clearly the powers which the local municipality, or the state, may
vest in special commissions.
87. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 697, 703 (1873).
88. Ibid.
89. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 697, 698 (1873).
90. 336 Pa. 345, 353, 9 A.2d 609, 612 (1940).
91. 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947). It would seem that exercising the power
of eminent domain in this instance was definitely a municipal function, and the court
could have easily reached the desired result by looking to the origin and purpose of
the section and holding that it restricts only the state government. The most recent
Supreme Court case, Evans v. West Norriton Twp. Municipal Authority, - Pa. -,
87 A.2d 474 (1952), clearly indicates that, although the court asserts that the com-
missions or authorities created by local municipalities may not perform any municipal
function, actually section 20 is being read in these cases as follows: "A municipality
shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association any
power to levy taxes." This interpretation deletes from section 20 the following words:
"to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or
effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, . . . or perform any municipal function
whatever." The Evans case (supra) held constitutional a sewage disposal authority
to be set up if the sewer plan and the cost of construction were initially approved by
the elected commissioners of the township.
92. Art. III, § 17. "No appropriation shall be made to any charitable or educa-
tional institution not under the absolute control of the Commonwealth, other than
normal schools established by law for the professional training of teachers for the
public schools of the State, except by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected
to each House."
Welfare appropriations.-Sections 17,02 18,93 and 19 0 deal with
appropriations for what are there denominated "charitable" purposes.
Section 17 provides that appropriations to charitable or educational insti-
tutions not controlled by the state, with the exception of normal schools,
shall be by two-thirds vote. This is in contrast to a simple majority vote
required to enact ordinary bills.95 While the Debates show an apprecia-
tion on the part of one delegate 98 of what is today a controversial subject-
whether state support of education and welfare projects is justified without
state control-the two-thirds vote requirement is not the result of com-
promise on this basic issue. Rather it was drafted with the purpose of
preventing inconsiderate, indiscriminate grants to private charities from
draining the Treasury," and as an ingenuous effort to restrict oppor-
tunities for corruption.98 Normal schools were excepted simply because
it was anticipated that they would soon come under state control.99 As it
stands, section 17 is merely a further example of unjustifiable interference
with legislative discretion. The issue of state grants with or without state
control should be carefully considered, and, according to the decision
reached, the section should either be eliminated entirely or redrafted to
forbid such appropriations. 10°
That part of section 18 101 forbidding appropriations for charitable or
educational purposes to sectarian institutions is a corollary of the prin-
ciple of separation of church and state found in the State Bill of Rights.10 2
The principle is one with which few would quarrel today, and this pro-
vision of section 18 should remain unaltered. Section 19103 is an excep-
tion carved out of the above prohibition. There is no logical reason for
creating an exception in the case of women widowed and children or-
phaned by war rather than by some other catastrophe. Where institu-
tional care of such unfortunates is necessary, state-controlled nonsectarian
93. Art. III, § 18. "No appropriations shall be made for charitable, educational
or benevolent purposes to any person or community nor to any denominational and
sectarian institution, corporation or association: Provided, that appropriations may be
made for pensions or gratuities for military services, and to blind persons twenty-one
years of age and upwards, and for assistance to mothers having dependent children,
and to aged persons without adequate means of support."
94. Art. III, § 19. "The general assembly may make appropriations of money
to institutions wherein the widows of soldiers are supported or assisted, or the orphans
of soldiers are maintained or educated; but such appropriations shall be applied
exclusively to the support of such widows and orphans."
95. Art. III, § 4.
96. 2 CONsTITUTIONAL DEBATES 641 (1873), remarks of Mr. Hanna.
97. Id. at 644.
98. Lobbyists who obtained appropriations for private charities received a cut;
and perhaps the legislators themselves profited. Id. at 638, 639. It was believed that
the requirement of a two-thirds, rather than a majority, vote would insure sufficient
notice to prevent such practices.
99. Id. at 640, 641.
100. The Model State Constitution forbids such appropriations. MODEL STATE
CONST. Art. VII, § 705 (1948).
101. Note 93 supra.
102. Art. I, § 3.
103. Note 94 supra.
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institutions, which are eligible for state aid, 0 4 are open to them. Section
19 should be deleted.
While the provision in section 18 forbidding state aid to sectarian
institutions has caused little difficulty, 0 5 the prohibition against charitable
grants "to any person or community" has proved a source of embarrass-
ment to both the courts and legislature. As originally adopted the section
read "No appropriations, except for pensions or gratuities for military
services, shall be made for charitable, educational, or benevolent purposes,
to any person or community, nor to any denominational or sectarian
institution, corporation or association." The original purpose of for-
bidding aid to "any person or community" was to prevent the passage
of so-called "calamity acts"-direct grants to individuals and communities
to compensate for property losses due to fires and like catastrophes.106
But because of the inclusive sweep of the terms "person" and "com-
munity," in addition to an unnecessarily broad judicial interpretation, the
provision has stood in the way of the social welfare projects of the past
twenty-five years.
In Busser v. Snyder 10 7 an old age assistance act appropriating funds
to a state agency to be distributed among the aged with incomes of less
than $365 per year or property less than $3000 in value was held uncon-
stitutional, as violative of this provision of section 18. It was held that
the state agency was merely a funnel through which the appropriation
flowed to those to be benefited, whom the court found to be included in
the term "any person." The court said that the terms "charitable, educa-
tional or benevolent purposes" comprehended "any form of gift by per-
sons or governments kindly disposed towards their subjects or others
without obligation to themselves, a desire to do good, to advance man's
well-being, a love towards mankind, with a wish to promote prosperity
and happiness," 108 and that the words ("any person or community")
''are not limited to the idea of a single person or place . . . [but] are used
in an inclusive sense, relating to an individual or a group or class of per-
sons, wherever situated ... ." 109 The court rejected the contention that
such state assistance should not be construed as "charity" but as an obli-
gation of government. While it admitted that at the time the constitution
was adopted it was well recognized that the state has a "duty" to support
the poor, and that such a duty is not included in the term "charity," the
opinion limited this duty to the support of those included under the term
"poor" as it was understood in 1873, stating that persons with incomes
of $365 or property worth $3000 do not fall within that class.
104. State aid to nonsectarian institutions not under the control of the state would
of course be unconstitutional under Art. III, § 17, note 92 ,upra.
105. Most of the cases revolve around the question of what constitutes a "sec-
tarian" institution.
106. 2 CONSTITUT'IONAL DEBATES 648-663 (1873).
107. 282 Pa. 440, 128 Atl. 80 (1925).
108. Id. at 450, 128 Atl. at 83.
109. Id. at 451, 128 Atl. at 84.
Thus the Busser case stands for the proposition that, while a welfare
project limited to the aid of complete paupers is not "charity" but a "duty,"
as soon as an attempt is made to benefit others than those entirely desti-
tute, the government is no longer performing an obligation but is dis-
tributing forbidden largesse. The court could have avoided this interpreta-
tion by construing the provision as forbidding aid to individual persons and
communities, i.e., special legislation, as opposed to classes of the same.
But militating against this construction are the undeniably broad terms used
and the fact that the constitution makers must themselves have realized the
implication of these terms, since they felt it necessary in drafting the provi-
sion to except "pensions [and] gratuities for military service" from its
operation.
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never retreated from the
above interpretation of "person or community," later decisions have modi-
fied the apparently stultifying effect of the Busser decision on welfare
legislation. Thus, while nominally reaffirming the doctrine that the state's
"duty" (as opposed to "charity") to the underprivileged extends only to
that class considered "poor" in 1873, absolute pauperism as a qualification
for state aid was not insisted on in upholding an unemployment relief act.110
But, after the Busser case, amendments to Section 18 further excepted from
its operation appropriations to assist the blind, the aged, and mothers with
dependent children. These amendments testify to the obstructive effect
of that decision.
However, the vitality of the Busser case subsequently has been further
sapped in two respects. In Commonwealth v. Perkins,'-" the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted the Superior Court's opinion sustaining the con-
stitutionality of the Unemployment Compensation Law of 1936. This
act was designed to mesh with the federal Social Security Act of 1935. It
provides for "contributions" by Pennsylvania employers to the Pennsyl-
vania Unemployment Compensation Fund, which contributions are then
paid over to the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund, and requisitioned back
to the Pennsylvania Fund as needed for distribution. The court, while
not overruling the Busser case, rejected the distinction made there that
assistance in support of the indigent is an obligatory duty and hence not
charity, and that assistance to others than this class is discretionary and
therefore charity. The court said "If appropriations to perform the ob-
ligatory duties are not charities or benevolences, it would seem to be a re-
finement to hold where there is a governmental concern with which the
legislature has discretionary power that it would be a benevolence merely
because the one is obligatory and the other is discretionary." 112 Thus
"governmental concern" would appear to be the present criterion for deter-
mining whether or not welfare legislation is for a "charitable purpose"
within section 18.
110. Commonwealth v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 Atl. 697 (1932).
111. 342 Pa. 529, 21 A.2d 45 (1941).
112. Id. at 534, 21 A.2d at 49.
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The court based its decision on an alternative ground, however, which
points to a way by which the application of section 18 can be circumvented
entirely. It held that legislation creating and segregrating from the gen-
eral treasury a fund to be expended for a special purpose is not an "appro-
priation" within the meaning of section 18. The court itself deprecated
the obvious artificiality of any such distinction, but its legitimacy has been
recognized in a later case.113
The backing and filling by the court since the Busser case and the
amendments thought necessary to insure the safe passage of welfare legis-
lation expressively point up the shortcomings of section 18. The provision
forbidding appropriations to sectarian institutions should be retained, but
all else can be safely scrapped. The provisions of the constitution check-
ing special legislation are sufficient to prevent handouts to individual per-
sons and communities. There is no need to mention "charity" at all.
The section should simply read: "No appropriations shall be made to any
denominational or sectarian institution, corporation, or association."
Miscellaneous provisions.-Section 21,114 dealing with remedies for
injuries to persons and property, should be eliminated entirely. This sec-
tion falls logically into two divisions. The first provision, adopted by
amendment in 1915, authorizes the legislature to enact workmen's com-
pensation laws. At the time of passage the constitutionality of workmen's
compensation acts had been questioned. It seems clear that the amend-
ment was made in order to avoid the possibility of a decision holding that
the projected Pennsylvania act offended the state courts' notions of due
process." 5 It proved ultimately to have' been entirely unnecessary, since
the constitutionality of the act was upheld without even referring to the
amendment."'1 In addition, by constitutional authorization of "reasonable"
compensation to employees, the last word on compensation rates has been
left to the courts, which may strike down a given rate as "unreasonable." 117
113. Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa. 309, 56 A.2d 675 (1948).
114. Art. III, § 21: "The general assembly may enact laws requiring the payment
by employers and employes jointly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to employes
arising in the course of their employment, and for occupational diseases of employes,
whether or not such injuries or diseases result in death, and regardless of fault of
employer or employe, and fixing the basis of ascertainment of such compensation
and the maximum and minimum limits thereof; but in no other cases shall the general
assembly limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for in-
juries to persons or property, and in case of death from such injuries, the right shall
survive, and the general assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such actions shall
be prosecuted. No act shall prescribe any limitations of time within which suits may
be brought against corporations for injuries to persons or property, or for other
causes, different from those fixed by general laws regulating actions against natural
persons, and such acts now existing are avoided."
115. A New York compensation act had been struck down on this ground. Ives
v. South Buffalo R.R. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 435 (1911), discussed in Freund,
Constitutional Status of Workmen's Compenyation, 6 ILL L. Rav. 432 (1911). For a
discussion of the constitutional status of such acts at the time, see Note, Do Com-
pulsory Workmen's Compensation Laws Violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitutioi, 2 ST. Louis L. Rlv. 29 (1917).
116. Anderson v. Coal Co., 255 Pa. 33, 99 Atl. 215 (1916).
117. See Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore, 334 Pa. 449, 5 A.2d 152 (1939).
The decision as to which branch shall be final arbiter of reasonableness
should be left to the legislature's discretion.
The second part of section 21 I's deals with remedies for injuries to
persons and property other than workmen's compensation. It is provided
that the legislature may not limit the amount of damages recoverable for
such injuries; that in the case of wrongful death the action shall survive
and the legislature shall prescribe in whose favor the action may be brought;
and that the legislature may not create a statute of limitations in suits
against corporations different from that applying in the case of natural
persons. The purpose of including the provision for a death act is unclear
from the Debates. Doubts as to the constitutionality of such an act cannot
have been the motive, since the Acts of 1851 119 and 1855 120 had been
before the court on several occasions. 121 There appears to be no reason
why the provision should be retained. The reason for the inclusion of the
prohibitions against limitation of damages and special corporate statutes
of limitations, however, is quite clear: the ten years prior to 1873 had seen
the passage of special acts for the benefit of the railroads, limiting the
amount of damages recoverable for injuries and severely restricting the
time in which such actions could be brought.122 The drastic means adopted
to prevent such legislation is a further example of shortsighted transgres-
sion into areas where the legislature's discretion should control. Limitation
of damages and distinctions between corporations and natural persons as
to applicable statutes of limitations may both be reasonable in certain
cases.123  The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that
legislation creating distinctions between corporations and natural persons
may be reasonable classification in the face of the equal protection clause . 24
Section 22, as amended in 1933,125 provides that the legislature may
pass laws prescribing legal investments for fiduciaries. As originally
adopted this section forbade the legislature to authorize investment by
fiduciaries in the stocks and bonds of private corporations. It was included
because shortly before 1873 private corporations had persuaded the legis-
lature to pass special acts authorizing fiduciaries to invest in their securi-
ties. 28  Besides being discriminatory, such investments were considered a
118. Note 114 supra.
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (Purdon, 1931).
120. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1602 (Purdon, 1931).
121. E.g., Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. 318 (1858) (Act of 1851);
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Keller, 67 Pa. 300 (1871) (Act of 1855).
122. 2 CONSTITUTIONM DEBATES 727-740 (1873).
123. As to limitation of damages, the policy of some other jurisdictions has been
to impose statutory limitations on the amount recoverable for wrongful death; e.g.,
CONN. RFv. GEN. STAT. § 8296 (1949); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5475 (1949). The
Pennsylvania courts in practice limit the amount of such recovery. See Hankin v.
Mack, 364 Pa. 417, 72 A.2d 268 (1950).
As to distinctions between individuals and corporations, an act suspending the
operation of the statute of limitations against corporations during receivership was held
to violate § 21. Gallagher v. Silver Brook Coal Co., 61 Pa. Super. 1 (1915). The
distinction seems reasonable.
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radical departure from sound fiduciary standards. The amendment of
1933 merely restores to the legislature the control over fiduciary adminis-
tration which rightfully belongs to it. It is unnecessary, however, since it
merely spells out affirmatively the power which the legislature would have
in its absence.
Section 27 provides "No State office shall be continued or created for
the inspection or measuring of any merchandise, manufacture or com-
modity, but any county or municipality may appoint such officers when
authorized by law." The puniness of the consideration leading to adoption
of this section is probably unparalleled in constitutional annals. At first
glance the provision would appear to evince a kindly disposition to protect
the shopkeeper from bureaucratic snoopings under the counter; but the
real reason for its inclusion was that the legislature had been creating
inspectorships by the score as sinecures for political hacks.127 The provi-
sion is an odd anachronism in an~age of increasingly contralized regulation
of trade, and should be eliminated.
CONCLUSION
In order to handle efficiently the diverse and constantly increasing
problems of modern government, the legislature must be free to use its
discretion, untrammeled by the host of substantive limitations found in the
Constitution of 1873. If we grant the legislature broad discretion on sub-
stantive questions, we must rely upon an intelligent and informed electorate
to choose competent legislators, upon whom procedural restrictions will be
imposed to insure them an opportunity to act intelligently. Ultimately, the
amount of freedom granted to the legislature must be determined by the
elected representatives of the people at a constitutional convention; how-
ever, this analysis of Article III may be helpful both to those who must
determine whether the constitution should be revised and to those who may
revise it.
Philip Fisher, Jr.
William A. Kelley, Jr.
Thomas J. Timoney
124. See Power Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 493 (1926).
125. Art. III, § 22. "The general assembly may, from time to time, by law,
prescribe the nature and kind of investments for trust funds to be made by executors,
administrators, trustees, guardians and other fiduciaries."
126. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 744-749 (1873).
127. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 709-718.
